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The rise of highly digitalized businesses, such as Google and Amazon, has 
strained the traditional income tax rules on nexus and profit allocation. Traditionally, 
profit is allocated to market countries where consumers are located only if the 
business has physical presence. However, in the digital economy, profits can be 
easily generated in market countries without a physical presence, resulting in tax 
revenue loss for market countries. In response, market countries have started 
imposing a new tax, called the digital services tax (“DST”), on certain digital 
business models, which has ignited heated debate across the globe. Supporters 
defend the DST, designed as a turnover style consumption tax, as an effective 
measure to make up the foregone revenue in the digital economy because it is not 
bound by the traditional rules of income taxation. Opponents criticize DST as “ring-
fencing” or segregating certain digital business models, discriminating against 
American tech giants, and arguably imposing a disguised income tax. The debate 
has been focused on the imminent impact, such as who is the immediate winner and 
loser, but the discussion lacks efforts to understand the fundamentals of DST, 
especially with regard to the consumption tax aspect.   
This Article is the first academic paper that highlights DST as a consumption 
tax and provides normative implications for policy makers deliberating a DST. It 
argues that a DST, with certain modifications, can be a good solution for the tax 
challenges of the digital economy. First, the Article offers an in-depth analysis of 
DST’s economic impact in multi-sided digital platforms. Second, it offers the 
advantages of DST over other types of consumption tax, such as value added tax and 
destination-based cash flow tax. Finally, it illustrates how the recent Supreme Court 
case of South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., which discusses sales tax imposed on certain 
remote sellers, and the subsequent Netflix Tax, may shed light on ways to overcome 
the ring-fencing problem of the DST.  
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As Google, Amazon, Facebook, YouTube, and other highly digitalized 
businesses become mainstream in the 21st century economy, they pose new 
global tax challenges. The traditional income tax rules on nexus and profit 
allocation, which allocate tax revenue among relevant countries, no longer 
work effectively in the digitalized economy. Under the current rule, global 
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profits of multinational enterprises are partly allocated to market countries 
where consumers are located only if the business has a physical presence in 
the market country.1 The traditional rule and the resulting revenue allocation 
were considered reasonable in the 20th century’s brick and mortar economy, 
where multinational enterprises access consumers in the market country by 
operating their business through a branch or a subsidiary. The branch or 
subsidiary establishes a physical presence, or tax nexus, in the market country 
by maintaining a physical connection in the country.2 The profit allocation 
then rules mandate allocating certain profits to the market country first and 
the remaining profits to the home country of the multinational enterprises.3 
However, such conventional rules do not work effectively in the new digital 
economy, where digital firms operate in market countries without a physical 
presence and connect multiple groups of customers via online platforms. 
To illustrate the concept of a highly digitalized business model, let us 
consider the hypothetical example of William. William, who lives in the 
United Kingdom, receives a bonus and would like to use it to purchase a new 
car. William is particularly interested in a mid-size luxury German sedan, and 
he begins the car buying process by performing some preliminary research. 
He begins his research by “googling” key words like “10 best sedans for 
2019.” William skips search results relating to Toyota, Hyundai, and similar 
sedans, and only focuses on sedans such as Mercedes-Benz E-Class, Audi A7, 
and BMW 5 Series. After virtually touring some German luxury sedans, 
William remembers to check the results of his favorite football club’s recent 
match and visits ESPN’s website. Next to the results he was looking for, 
William finds an advertisement of Mercedes-Benz E-Class, which he is now 
more likely to click on than before he began his preliminary car research.4  
The above example shows the salient characteristics of highly digitalized 
 
1 For the Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”, or the “Code”)’s term, this physical presence 
refers to a U.S. Trade or Business, to which income of foreign service providers is allocated 
and subject to the U.S. tax jurisdiction. 26 U.S.C. [hereinafter, I.R.C.] § 862(b). A de minimis 
level of services rendered in the U.S. does not constitute a U.S. Trade or Business if, for 
example, the services are performed while the foreign service provider is present in the U.S. 
temporarily or no more than 90 days during the year. I.R.C. § 864(b)(1). 
2 CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ROBERT J. PERONI & RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, TAXATION 
OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS: MATERIALS, TEXT, AND PROBLEMS 182 (4th ed. 2011); 
U.S. Model Income Tax Convention arts. 5 & 7, Feb. 17, 2016, 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/treaties.aspx 
(hereinafter, U.S. Model). 
3  U.S. Model arts. 5 & 7; OECD, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON 
CAPITAL: CONDENSED VERSION 2017, arts. 5 & 7, at 31–34 (2017) (hereinafter, OECD 
MODEL).  
4 The Google, German auto manufacturing company, and UK consumer example is 
inspired by a similar example in Wei Cui, The Digital Services Tax: A Conceptual Defense, 
TAX L. REV. __, 12–14 (forthcoming 2020). 
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business models and the resulting tax challenges. Google is the highly 
digitalized business model utilizing a multi-sided platform. William is part of 
a group of users—user-buyers—and Mercedes-Benz is part of another group 
of users—user-sellers or user-advertisers. Google, located in the United 
States, offers digital search engine service to the first group of users—user-
buyers—located in various countries, including the United Kingdom, through 
which it collects a tremendous amount of valuable user data. Google has a 
proprietary algorithm that allows it to offer improved search results to the 
first group users in the UK who demonstrate similar interests to those of 
William, because the algorithm learns how to tailor experiences to individual 
user-buyers in the UK market. In addition, Google’s algorithm offers 
customized advertising services to the second group of users—user-
advertisers or user-sellers—such as Mercedes-Benz, that want to launch a 
targeted advertisement campaign to UK consumers “based on their 
demonstrated interests.”5 Most of Google’s profits come from user-sellers or 
user-advertisers, rather than user-buyers in the market country.  
Such highly digitalized business models did not exist when the traditional 
income tax rules on nexus and profit allocation were formed in the early 20th 
century.6 Market countries, or source countries in tax terms, are entitled to 
exercise primary taxing rights on a multinational enterprise’s profits 
generated from the market if the enterprise has a physical presence in the 
market country. However, the newly emerged highly digitalized businesses 
can access consumers and generate profits in market countries without an 
actual physical presence in the country. In the above example, Google, 
located in the United States, can render the search engine and online 
advertisement services to consumers in the UK market without a physical 
presence in the UK. Thus, the United Kingdom cannot collect tax revenue 
from Google’s profits, even though Google accessed, and gained a profit 
from, the UK market and consumers.  
Furthermore, the features of multi-sided platforms7 make collecting tax 
 
5 Id. at 10.  
6  Lilian V. Faulhaber, Taxing Tech: The Future of Digital Taxation, 
39 VA. TAX REV. 145, 150 (2019). 
7 Multi-sided platforms or multi-sided markets are often used by case law and literature 
on economics, antitrust, and administrative regulations. See e.g., Ohio v. American Express 
Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018); Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A 
Progress Report, 37 RAND J. OF ECON. 645 (2006); Erik Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, J. 
CORP. L. (forthcoming 2019); Eleanor Wilking, Hotel Tax Incidence with Heterogenous 
Firm Evasion: Evidence from Airbnb Remittance Agreements (Working Paper, 2016), 
https://www.austaxpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Wilking.pdf. In tax literature, 
the multi-sided platforms are just referred to as “digitalization,” “digital economy,” or 
“certain highly digitalized businesses.” See e.g., OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES 
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revenue by market countries from such businesses even more difficult. 
Multisided platforms serve two or more distinct groups of customers or users 
who value each other's participation.8 Users on one side of the market are 
charged little to nothing to participate, while the users on the other side are 
charged all or the majority of the profits.9 In the above example, Google does 
not charge fees to retail users. Instead, it operates other business lines, such 
as online advertising services, that connect different types of user groups—
user-sellers and user-buyers. Most of the profits do not come from the 
consumers in the UK. Technically, while Google’s revenue in this example 
is relevant to the UK market because it collects and uses UK consumers’ data, 
the profits are paid by German manufacturing companies. Thus, it is more 
challenging for the UK to exercise tax jurisdiction if the business is located 
in a different country and the group paying for the services—user-advertisers 
or user-sellers—is located in a third country. 
The preceding example illustrates the archaic nature of the traditional 
nexus and profit allocation rules. As described above, under traditional tax 
rules, market countries lose tax revenue simply because of the unique nature 
of highly digitalized business models and their ability to infiltrate market 
countries through their digital platforms without the need of a physical 
presence. In response, and in an effort to recoup some of the lost tax revenue, 
market countries, such as the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, have 
unilaterally introduced, or plan to introduce, a new tax, called the Digital 
Service Tax (“DST”), for certain highly digitalized businesses.10 This has 
ignited heated debate across the globe. DST is designed as a turnover tax, 
which is a subcategory of consumption tax, because policy makers think 
introducing a new tax rather than modifying conventional income tax rules 
would be more effective to address the tax challenges in the digital economy. 
However, the United States, which is home to many global tech giants, 
continues to oppose European DSTs because it believes these proposals are 
discriminatory against U.S. tech giants.11 Moreover, the U.S. government has 
even considered implementing tariffs of up to 100% on a range of French 
 
OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 – 2015 FINAL REPORT (Oct. 5, 2015) [hereinafter 
OECD, BEPS ACTION 1]; OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION — 
INTERIM REPORT (2018) [hereinafter OECD, 2018 INTERIM REPORT]. 
8 This refers to network effects. A network effect exists when the value of product or 
service provided by a business increases according to the number of other users it. CARL 
SHAPIRO AND HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK 
ECONOMY 13 (1999). Such effect exists in the highly digitalized businesses, such as Twitter, 
Facebook, Google, and Amazon, because the value of their services to users increases as 
more users join the platform.   
9 See American Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2281. 
10 See infra Part I.C. 
11 Id.  
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imports, including cheese, cosmetics, and champagne in order to discourage 
the adoption of France’s DST.12 
Realizing the need to offer a global solution for the tax challenges of the 
digital economy, the European Union (“EU”), the G20, and the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”), which are 
important voices in international taxation, have offered a couple of proposals, 
including modifying current income tax rules and a prototype of DST.13 All 
proposals attempt to give market countries greater taxing right, but none of 
these proposals have come to a consensus as to a solution.14 In the meantime, 
DST is widespread, becoming the new status quo.15  
DSTs are levied on the gross revenue of a firm. In tax terms, this is a tax 
on gross receipts, called a “turnover tax,” and is considered a subcategory of 
“consumption tax,”16  as opposed to income tax. An important reason to 
design the DST as a consumption tax is to reward market countries without 
being restricted by the traditional international tax rules that require physical 
presence. Market countries are where the relevant business’ activity and 
participatory user base are located, and thus, a consumption tax-based DST 
can allocate an amount of profit to the relevant market country, irrespective 
of whether the business has a local physical presence, so long as all other 
requirements are met. In addition, DSTs apply only to a limited scope of 
digital businesses where tax challenges primarily manifest, such as social 
media platforms, search engines, and online marketplaces.17 Furthermore, 
both global and local revenue of digital businesses identified as in-scope 
businesses should exceed a specified threshold amount of revenue to trigger 
 
12 Alex M. Parker, US Proposes 100% Tariffs on French Imports Over Digital Tax, 
LAW360 (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.law360.com/technology/articles/1224350.  
13 The proposals will be discussed in infra Parts I.B. and C. in detail. 
14 Andrew D. Mitchell, Taxing Tech: Risks of an Australian Digital Services Tax under 
International Economic Law 20 MELB. J. INT’L L. 88, 90–91 (2019) (citing various interim 
DST proposals and enactments and the abandonment by the EU towards a regional DST 
structure). 
15 Elke Asen, FAQ on Digital Services Taxes and the OECD’s BEPS Project, TAX 
FOUND. (Jan. 30, 2020), https://taxfoundation.org/oecd-beps-digital-tax/ (showing that 
Austria, France, Hungary, Italy, and Turkey have implemented a DST while Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK have published proposals and other country’s 
have shown intentions to implement DSTs in the future). See infra Part I.C.4.  
16 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 649 
(6th ed. 1997) (including the turnover tax as part of a list of consumption taxes including 
retail sales tax, use tax, excise tax, and gross income tax). 
17 See Proposal for a Council Directive on the Common System of a Digital Services 
Tax on Revenues Resulting from The Provision Of Certain Digital Services, COM 7–10 
(2018) 148 final (Mar. 21, 2018) [hereinafter EU Digital Services Tax Proposal 2018]; HM 
TREASURY, BUDGET 2018 DIGITAL SERVICES TAX (2018), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_da
ta/file/752172/DST_web.pdf [hereinafter HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2018 DST]. 
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DST application.18  
However, current design of DSTs is not without criticism. First, DSTs are 
criticized as “ring-fencing,” or segregating, certain digital business models 
from the rest of the economy for tax purposes.19 Second, they are blamed as 
discriminating against American tech giants, such as Google, Amazon, 
Facebook, YouTube, and Uber, because only those American tech giants can 
satisfy the revenue thresholds and be subject to a DST.20 Third, they are also 
reprimanded as arguably imposing a “disguised corporate income tax,” rather 
than a consumption tax, on the profits of certain digital firms to compensate 
for forgone corporate tax revenue.21 If a DST is taken as a corporate income 
tax, only home countries of digital firms could collect tax revenue from 
relevant profits generated in market countries, because traditional 
international tax rules on tax nexus and profit allocation provide such so as 
to eliminate double taxation.22 One of the reasons that DSTs are designed as 
a consumption tax is to reward market countries without being bound by the 
traditional international tax rules, but critics attack the design of DSTs, 
interpret DSTs as disguised income tax, and revert the issue back to the 
traditional rules setting where we cannot reward market countries.  
The criticism is largely based on practical concerns and focused on the 
imminent impact, such as who is the winner and loser in the short term, rather 
 
18  EU Digital Services Tax Proposal 2018, supra note 17, at 10 (providing an 
international revenue threshold of €750 million and a domestic threshold of €50 million); 
HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2018 DST (providing a “double threshold” of £500 million globally 
and £25 million of UK revenues). 
19 Daniel Bunn, A Summary of Criticisms of the EU Digital Tax, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 22, 
2018), https://taxfoundation.org/eu-digital-tax-criticisms/#_ftn16; see also OECD, BEPS 
ACTION 1, supra note 7, at 149 (discussing neutrality as an important part of evaluating taxes 
on the digital economy). 
20 See Initiation of a Section 301 Investigation of France’s Digital Services Tax, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 34042, 34042 (July 16, 2019); see also Jake Kanter, Amazon, Facebook, and Google 
Come Out Swinging After Being Slammed With ‘Unjustifiable’ New Tax on Their Sales, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 14, 2019, 4:21 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-
facebook-and-google-lobby-french-digital-services-tax-2019-8. 
21 See e.g., Roland Ismer & Christoph Jescheck, Taxes on Digital Services and the 
Substantive Scope of Application of Tax Treaties: Pushing the Boundaries of Article 2 of the 
OECD Model?, 46 INTERTAX 573, 577 (2018); EU Digital Services Tax Proposal 2018, 
supra note 17 (stating that the measure to target revenues of digital services based on user 
value creation underpins the Council intention to adapt corporate tax rules to new digital 
business models). 
22 Double taxation occurs in international tax when a market country (or source country 
in tax term) and home country (or residence country) levy tax on the same declared income. 
See Alvin Warren, Income Tax Discrimination Against International Commerce, 54 TAX L. 
REV. 131, 133 (2001). Many countries enter into income tax treaties to avoid such double 
taxation. Under the tax treaties, source countries offer the reduced withholding tax rates for 
aliens’ income from domestic sources, whereas residence countries offer tax exemption or 
credit to foreign-source income. GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 63. 
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than considering DST theoretically. Furthermore, the criticism contains little 
discussion of the consumption tax aspect of the DST, although the positive 
law provides DST as a turnover tax and consumption tax. The third point of 
criticism argues that although DST is designed as a consumption tax, it is 
introduced to compensate for forgone corporate tax revenue; but it is not fully 
convincing why as a result DST should be interpreted as corporate income 
tax despite what positive law provides.23  
As the first academic paper to highlight the consumption tax aspect of 
DST, this Article explores the origin of DST and analyzes the key common 
features of a DST that are distinct from conventional income tax. It offers the 
normative proposal that a consumption tax-based DST can be a suitable tax 
policy to solve the tax challenges of the digital economy if the existing design 
concerns are mitigated. When it comes to a tax proposal based on 
consumption tax, there has been considerable theoretical discourse 
comparing the pros and cons of consumption tax and income tax with regard 
to three criteria of tax policy: efficiency, equity, and administrability (or 
simplicity).24  Consumption tax is considered more efficient and simpler, 
while income tax is considered normatively superior to achieve equity.25 
Under the above criteria, the consumption tax-based DST can present its 
merits, as being largely relevant to business taxation and international 
taxation where efficiency and administrability are more emphasized than 
equity. Furthermore, DST is particularly efficient because although the tax 
base is a digital firm’s gross revenue, not net income, such a firm incurs 
almost zero marginal cost, reducing the additional concerns of economic 
distortion commonly found in turnover taxes.26 In conclusion, DST could 
offer a new path towards a consumption tax in international taxation for the 
digital economy. 
However, to maximize the advantages offered by DST and for it to be a 
viable global solution for taxing the digital economy, further research and 
 
23 Countries may introduce consumption tax in addition to income tax, or increase one 
tax rate to compensate revenue loss resulting from the rate cut from another tax. See e.g., 
Eimi Yamamitsu et al., Japan Raises Taxes on Its Spenders Despite Growth Worries, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/30/business/japan-abe-consumption 
-tax.html; Fahim Mostafa, The Hungarian Experience Has Strengthened the Case For Flat 
Taxes, FORBES (Jan. 27, 2017, 4:06 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/01/27/the-hungarian-experience-has-
strengthened-the-case-for-flat-taxes/#5378c74cd477. 
24  Some tax scholars call the third criterion of administrability as simplicity. See 
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ ET AL, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 28–31 
(8th ed. 2018).  
25 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 11 (2006); 
see also Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption 
Tax over an Ideal an Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1425 (2006).  
26 See Cui, supra note 4, at 25–27. 
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improvement is required to overcome certain lingering issues. Moreover, the 
study of multi-sided markets is still an emerging topic, and thus there is not 
much tax scholarship analyzing these issues. This Article aims to fill the gap.  
First, this Article explores the tax incidence of DST as a consumption tax 
in the case of multi-sided digital platforms. Current literature significantly 
lacks in-depth analysis on this issue. The early opponents of DST argued that 
a DST would be borne by consumers and would adversely affect the demand 
side of the digital economy. 27  However, such critique neglected the 
characteristics of multi-sided platforms, where service providers do not 
charge fees on consumers, or user-buyers. It would be more plausible to pass 
the tax burden onto user-sellers who are also business enterprises. This is 
exactly what the recent enactment of the French DST proves to be the case.28  
Second, this Article shows the advantages of DST over other types of 
consumption tax, such as Value Added Tax (“VAT”) and Destination-Based 
Cash Flow Tax (“DBCFT”), to solve tax challenges in the digital economy. 
As to VAT, it would be difficult to define the “value addition” or “value 
creation” by a digital firm. In the William-Google example, it is difficult to 
answer whether, and to what extent, Google’s value is created by either 
engineers writing computer codes of algorithm in California or by various 
user-buyers in the UK. By contributing user data, user-buyers like William 
allow Google not only to offer the improved tailored experiences to future 
users, but also sell targeted advertising services to German auto 
manufacturing companies. This conundrum is analogous to the old debate on 
which country should exercise the primary taxing right over the income 
derived from natural resource extraction—is it the home country of 
multinational oil companies with extraction technology, or the source country 
with natural resources on its soil? Considering that the natural resource 
problem has not been fully resolved, the Article suspects that introducing 
VAT may repeat the same problem concerning value creation.  
Another advantage that DST offers over other types of consumption tax 
is that DST can effectively reward market countries in a way that the 
 
27 Julian Jessop, Why the EU’s Digital Turnover Tax is a Bad Idea, EUR, POLICY INFO. 
CTR., www.epicenternetwork.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Why-the-EU’s-digital -
turnover-tax-is-a-bad-idea-1.pdf; Matthias Bauer, Five Questions about the Digital Services 
Tax to Pierre Moscovici, EUR. CTR. INT’L POLITICAL ECON. 4–6 (2018), https://ecipe.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/Five-Questions-about-the-Digital-Services-Tax-to-Pierre-
Moscovici.pdf.  
28 However, whether such tax incidence on the user-seller side is normatively desirable 
is another question. If one of the policy rationales of market countries to justify DST is the 
monopolistic position of digital tech giants, then in theory, digital firms ought to absorb the 
whole tax incidence, instead of passing part of the economic burden to the user-seller group. 
Still, there is no clear explanation on what ought to happen based on economic model 
analysis and what is happening based on empirical analysis. See infra Part III.A.   
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traditional cash flow tax, such as DBCFT, cannot. DBCFT gives taxing rights 
to the destination country of the sales of goods and services connected by the 
cash flow, because it posits that the destination of sales is the place where the 
consumption occurs.29 However, in multi-sided platforms, market countries 
may not fall under the definition of destination under the DBCFT, because 
the cash flow exists only between the digital businesses providing services 
and user-sellers. In the William-Google example, cash flow exists only 
between Google in the U.S. and Mercedes-Benz in Germany. Thus, the 
destination of cash flow is either the United States or Germany,30 and cannot 
be the United Kingdom, the market country all policy proposals aim to give 
more taxing rights. Hence, it is skeptical to recommend DBCFT to reward 
market countries. 
Third, this Article proposes to improve the “ring-fencing” problem by 
overcoming the limited scope of DST. Only search engines, social media 
platforms, and online marketplaces are currently within the scope of DST and 
subject to pay the DST, whereas certain regulated financial and payment 
services and online content providers are excluded and thus exempted from 
DST.31 So, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Google, Amazon, Kayak, Uber, 
and Airbnb are subject to DST, but PayPal, Netflix, Hulu, Spotify, and 
Ubisoft are exempted from DST liability. However, the current distinctions 
between in-scope and out-of-scope businesses are arbitrary and hard to justify 
theoretically. It is not fully convincing to include YouTube and exclude 
Spotify, because their business models share many common features.32  
To find a way to overcome the ring-fencing problem, this Article both  
introduces the recent Supreme Court case of South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 
which discusses sales tax imposed on certain remote sellers,33 and analyzes 
subsequent state legislation introducing the so-called “Netflix Tax” because 
both developments could shed light on possible solutions.34 More than thirty 
 
29 So, for domestic tax purposes, receipts from exports are not included in taxable 
revenues and imports are included in taxable revenue. For detailed explanation on DBCFT, 
see e.g., Alan Auerbach et al., Destination-Based Cash Flow Taxation, Said Business School 
Research Paper 2017-09 (2017).   
30 More precisely, the destination is Germany in this example, because sales of services 
occur in Germany, and thus Google cannot include such receipts, or cash inflow, from this 
transaction in its taxable revenue. On the other hand, the cash outflow, or expenses, is taxed 
in the origin country where such expenses are incurred. Id. at 16.     
31 See Cui, supra note 4, at 5–6. 
32 The only difference is how much revenue derives from ad-based services—83% for 
YouTube and 10% for Spotify—and from premium services. However, the ratio between the 
two types of services itself is not likely to be a good criterion to draw the line between the 
two groups of digital firms. See infra Part III.C. 
33 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
34 The “Netflix Tax” is a sales and use tax imposed on the digital streaming of shows, 
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state and local governments introduced the Netflix tax after Wayfair in order 
to impose sales tax—another type of consumption tax—on digital content 
providers, such as Netflix, Hulu, and Spotify.35 The fact that one type of 
consumption tax, a DST, excludes online content providers from its scope 
and another type of consumption tax, a sales tax, includes the same business 
within its scope confirms that the current line-drawing of DST is arbitrary. 
Thus, DST should overcome the ring-fencing problem by expanding its scope 
to other digital businesses based upon close analysis of the nature of those 
business models, rather than practical or political concerns.    
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I unravels the tax challenges in the 
digital economy and the origin of the DST by exploring the discussions in the 
G20, the OECD, and the EU. It further overviews varied versions of DSTs 
that countries unilaterally adopted, or plan to adopt. Part II examines the key 
features of DSTs, including the use of a turnover tax, revenue thresholds, and 
their limited scope. It then critically analyzes the three important challenges 
by which DSTs are particularly judged. Part III proposes that a consumption 
tax-based DST could be a normatively sound solution for the tax challenges 
in the digital economy if current shortcomings are improved, such as 
understanding tax incidence of DST, comparing DST with other types of 
consumption tax, and the ring-fencing problem concerning DST’s limited 
scope. The Article then concludes with a brief statement concerning the 
importance of scholarly discussion to the anticipated and necessary resolution 
of digitalized business taxation in the 21st century.        
 
I.  DIGITAL ECONOMY AND THE ORIGIN OF DST 
A.  Digital Economy and Global Tax Challenges 
When emerging digital technology companies, such as Google, started 
providing free email accounts or search engine services in the 1990s, many 
 
movies, music, and games. The content providers, such as Netflix, Hulu, and Spotify, that 
are excluded from DST are subject to the Netflix Tax. Currently, the list of states and cities 
imposing the Netflix Tax is as follows: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Chicago, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, 
Wyoming, and Washington D.C. Richard C. Auxier, Gail Cole, Chicago’s Streaming Tax Is 
A Bad Tax But It’s Not A “Netflix Tax”, TAX POLICY CENTER (Jun. 11, 2019), 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/chicagos-streaming-tax-bad-tax-its-not-netflix-tax. 
However, the specific tax imposed by each state within the category vary widely. 
35 Jared Walczak & Janelle Cammenga, State Sales Taxes in the Post-Wayfair Era 1, 6, 
TAX FOUND. (Dec. 12, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/state-remote-sales-tax-collection-
wayfair/. 
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people anticipated that such highly digitalized businesses would begin 
charging fees for their services. Nevertheless, Google and other highly 
digitalized business models, such as Amazon, YouTube, and Facebook, have 
not yet charged fees to retail users for significant parts of their services. 
Instead, they operate other business lines, such as online advertising 
technologies, cloud computing, and other online platforms that connect 
different types of user groups, such as user-sellers and user-buyers.  
Case law and literature refers such highly digitalized business models as 
multi-sided platforms.36 In tax literature, the multi-sided platforms are just 
referred to as “digitalization,” “digital economy,” or “certain highly 
digitalized businesses.”37 These digital platforms connect multiple distinct 
user groups, such as user-sellers and user-buyers, and provides them with 
certain network benefits. A network effect exists when the value of product 
or service provided by a business increases according to the number of other 
users it.38 This so-called network effect is present in the highly digitalized 
business models, such as Amazon, Twitter, and Google, because the value of 
their services to users increases as more users use the platform. In the 
William-Google example, Google collects a tremendous amount of valuable 
user data by offering search engine services, and it can offer improved search 
results to users as more users use the services. Recent tax policy literature 
describes this user data collection as “user participation,” because “soliciting 
the sustained engagement and active participation of users is a critical 
component” of highly digitalized businesses.39 
However, the number of users participating in a digital platform is not the 
only factor determining the value of the highly digitalized businesses. The 
platforms must have proprietary technology that allows it to offer improved 
services as more users participate. In the William-Google example, Google 
has a proprietary algorithm that allows it to offer improved search results to 
users in the UK who demonstrate similar interests to those of William, 
because the algorithm learns how to tailor experiences to individual user-
buyers in the UK market. In addition, Google’s algorithm offers customized 
advertising services to another group of users—user-advertisers, such as 
Mercedes-Benz, that want to launch a targeted advertisement campaign to 
 
36 See American Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2280–81; see also Rochet & Tirole, supra note 
7. 
37 See e.g., OECD, BEPS ACTION 1, supra note 7; OECD, 2018 INTERIM REPORT, supra 
note 7. 
38 CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE 
NETWORK ECONOMY 13 (1999). 
39  OECD, BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, PUBLIC CONSULTATION 
DOCUMENT, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 9 (Feb. 13 – 
Mar. 6, 2019) [hereinafter, OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT].  
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UK consumers “based on their demonstrated interests.”40 
Thus, without sufficient technology developed for a platform, the highly 
digitalized businesses cannot attract users. Without a solid user base, the 
technology cannot realize its potential value. The synergies between the 
intellectual property of the businesses and user participation is the key of the 
success.41 In this context, a recent report of the G20 and the OECD explains 
that the important features of digitalized business models include: i) cross 
jurisdictional scale without mass, ii) the heavy reliance on intangible assets, 
especially intellectual property, and iii) the importance of data, user 
participation and their synergies with intellectual property.42  
Many multi-sided platforms offer their services across borders. They can 
do it without establishing physical presence in market countries where users 
are located thanks to the advanced technology in the 21st century. Also, in 
many multi-sided markets, users in one side of the market is charged little or 
nothing to participate, while all or majority of the profits come from the users 
in the other side.43 In the William-Google example, Google can offer search 
engine services to William in the UK and online advertisement services to 
Mercedes-Benz in Germany, both remotely from the United States. Most of 
Google’s profits do not come from the retail user-buyer group, where William 
belongs, but rather from the user-seller group or user-advertiser group, where 
Mercedes-Benz belongs.  
These new features of the highly digitalized business models have led to 
global tax challenges. The traditional international income tax rules on tax 
nexus and profit allocation, which allocate tax revenue between market 
countries and home countries, no longer work effectively in the digitalized 
economy. 44  These businesses can generate profits in market countries 
 
40 Id. at 10.  
41 This synergy is different from the so-called chicken and egg problem in multi-sided 
platforms in that the former occurs between the platform and the overall users and the latter 
exists between different groups of users. The chicken and egg problem refers to the causality 
dilemma where each group of users relies on the presence of the other groups in order to 
derive value of the network. A platform wants to get both the buyers and the sellers onto the 
network but sellers will not come on board until the buyers do and vice versa. See e.g., 
Bernard Caillaud and Bruno Jullien, Chicken & Egg: Competition Among Intermediation 
Service Providers, 34 RAND J. ECON. 309 (2003). 
42 OECD, 2018 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 7, at 51.   
43 See American Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2281 (“Sometimes indirect network effects 
require two-sided platforms to charge one side much more than the other . . . [and t]he optimal 
price might require charging the side with more elastic demand a below-cost (or even 
negative) price.”)  
44 In tax literature, market countries more often refer to the source countries where the 
income is produced, and home countries refer to the residence country where the taxpayers 
maintain residence or, for corporate taxpayers, are incorporated. David Eric Spencer, BEPS 
and the Allocation of Taxing Rights (Part 4), 29 J. INT’L TAX’N 34, 36 (2018). 
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without physical presence, and firms’ revenue relevant to the market country 
is not technically paid by the consumers in the market. As a result, market 
countries cannot collect tax revenue from digital firms that access the 
consumers and generate profits in the market.   
To be specific, in traditional cross-border transactions, global profits of 
multinational enterprises are partly allocated to market countries where 
consumers are located only if the business has physical presence in the market 
country. 45  In other words, product sellers or service providers must be 
physically present in the subject market country for a substantial amount of 
time and render sales or services there.46 A subsidiary or a branch in the 
market country generally establishes physical presence of a firm, but an agent 
can also create the firm’s physical presence.47  In tax term, this physical 
presence refers to a “trade or business” or a “permanent establishment” of the 
firm.48 This physical presence constitutes a tax nexus, and then the profit 
allocation rules mandate allocating certain profits attributable to such tax 
nexus to the market country and the remaining profits to the home country of 
the multinational enterprises.49  
On the other hand, if the business does not have physical presence, or tax 
nexus, in a market country, the market country cannot exercise tax 
jurisdiction over the firm’s profits. This is where the traditional tax nexus and 
profit allocation rules are constrained in the highly digitalized business 
models. Those businesses can generate profits in market countries without 
physical presence. Furthermore, most of the firm’s profits do not come from 
the consumer in a traditional sense—user-buyer group in the William-Google 
example—but rather come from another type of users—user-seller or user-
advertiser group.     
The traditional physical presence requirement for a market country to 
exercise tax jurisdiction was considered reasonable when the rule was 
developed in the early 20th century.50 When a business renders services to 
foreign customers, somebody must go to that market country and be present 
there. If the business can render a service remotely, it is not enough to 
constitute a tax nexus in that market country because there is no physical 
 
45 I.R.C. § 862(b). 
46 See e.g., I.R.C. § 864(b)(1) (2012). 
47 See U.S. Model art. 5; OECD MODEL art. 5, supra note 3, at 31; GUSTAFSON ET AL., 
supra note 2, at 182; Christian Ehlermann & Marla Castelon, When Does a Dependent Agent 
Act Habitually?, 83 TAX NOTES INT’L 1141 (2016). 
48 See I.R.C. § 882; GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 181–82; U.S. Model art. 5. 
49 See OECD MODEL, supra note 3, at 175–77.  
50 See e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. 
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1088–89 (1997); Michael J. Graetz, The David 
R. Tillinghast Lecture Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated 
Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 319 (2001). 
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presence, and as such the service is not considered a substantial presence.51 
However, such rationale has become inadequate as more businesses offer 
remote services. It is also difficult to justify the rationale behind this physical 
presence requirement for highly digitalized businesses with multi-sided 
platforms, because firms’ revenue relevant to the market country is not paid 
by the consumers in the market, not to mention the lack of physical presence 
in the country.  
As a result, in the highly digitalized economy, market countries lose tax 
revenue that could have been available to them from traditional business 
models, and currently are unable to collect under traditional tax rules. 
Realizing the need to address the tax challenges of the digital economy, the 
EU, the G20, and the OECD, which lead international tax rules, have offered 
a few proposals to address the issue, discussed in Subparts B and D, all of 
which aim to give market countries greater taxing right. Many proposals try 
to modify current income tax rules in various ways, while others attempt to 
introduce a new turnover tax similar to DST.52 However, these proposals 
have yet to reach a consensus in the global community. In the meantime, 
market countries, especially in Europe, have unilaterally introduced, or plan 
to introduce, a DST for certain highly digitalized businesses. Subpart C offers 
a detailed survey of various DSTs. 
 
B.  European Developments: Modifying Income Tax v. A New Turnover Tax  
Having suffered prominently from the global tax challenges in the digital 
economy, Europe emerged the front-runner of advocating a new tax 
framework to deal with the growing digital economy.53  Since September 
2017, the European Commission (“EC”) developed a long-term solution that 
extends the concept of permanent establishment in income tax, and a short-
term solution that introduces a new turnover tax. This turnover tax, which is 
a subcategory of consumption tax as opposed to income tax, is called DST 
and has become a protype of various DSTs discussed in Subpart C.   
The main concern for the EC was to ensure that the digital economy 
would be taxed fairly, and cited the growing market share of tech companies 
in the European economy and the relatively low effective tax rates for digital 
businesses.54  The two main policy challenges noted by the EC were the 
 
51 See OECD, 2018 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 7, at 51 (explaining the problem of 
remote technology allowing digital businesses to “have an economic presence in a 
jurisdiction without having a physical presence”). 
52 All proposals will be discussed in infra Parts I.B. and I.D. in detail.  
53 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: 
A Fair and Efficient Tax System in the European Union for the Digital Single Market, COM 
(2017) 547 final (Sept. 21, 2017). 
54 Id. at 2, 4, 6.   
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questions of where to tax—i.e., nexus— and what to tax—i.e., value 
creation.55 In a Communication released on September 21, 2017, the EC 
advocated for a comprehensive solution, but also proposed three alternative, 
shorter-term, solutions.56 One of which is a levy on revenues generated from 
the provision of digital services or advertising activity, matching very closely 
to the eventual final proposal of the EC.57  
The 2017 Communication culminated in two proposals that the EC later 
released on March 21, 2018. The first proposal, called digital permanent 
establishment proposal, was intended as a long-term solution, and sought to 
establish corporate tax rules for taxing the digital economy by extending the 
current physical permanent establishment rules to those businesses with a 
significant digital presence.58 Thus, as long as a digital business enterprise 
has a significant digital presence in a market country, that market country 
may recognize the enterprises’ taxable nexus to its jurisdiction even if there 
is no physical or traditional permanent establishment of such enterprise in 
that jurisdiction, and thus may exercise taxing right for the revenue of such 
enterprise. A business would be deemed to have such taxable nexus, or digital 
permanent establishment, for cross border digital business by fulfilling any 
of the following criteria: i) annual revenues from supplying digital services 
in a member state exceeding €7 million, ii) having more than 100,000 users 
in a member state in a taxable year, and iii) business contracts for digital 
services created between the company and business users exceeding 3,000 in 
a taxable year.59 The proposal also included rules detailing how member 
states may attribute profits to or in respect of a significant digital presence, 
presented a non-exhaustive list of economically significant digital activities, 
and was intended to amend member states’ tax treaties with non-EU 
jurisdictions.60  
The second proposal is the origin of the DST, originally intended as a 
short-term solution establishing a common tax system targeting revenues 
stemming from the supply of certain digital services.61 The in-scope digital 
business subject to the interim DST tax included (i) the placing of digital 
 
55 Id. at 7. 
56 Id. at 10 (proposing three short-term solutions that include an equalization tax on 
turnover of digitalized companies, a withholding tax on digital transactions, and a levy on 
revenues generated from the provision of digital services or advertising activity). 
57 Id. The European Council adopted the conclusions of the EC on October 19, 2017. 
See generally Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council (Oct. 19, 2017). 
58 See generally Proposal for a Council Directive Laying Down Rules Relating to the 
Corporate Taxation of a Significant Digital Presence, COM (2018) 147 final (Mar. 21, 
2018). 
59 Id. at 16.   
60 Id. at 17–18.   
61 Id. at 3. 
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advertising targeted at users in a member state, (ii) the transmission of user 
data generated from user activity, and (iii) intermediation services that allow 
users to find other users and interact with them. 62  On the other hand, 
provision of digital content, payment services, on-line sales goods or 
services, and certain regulated financial and crowd-funding services were 
excluded. 63  The interim DST proposal included two revenue thresholds 
necessary for entities to be taxed under the interim DST: i) worldwide 
revenues exceeding €750 million, and ii) taxable revenues within the EU 
exceeding €50 million.64 Lastly, the proposal set a 3% tax rate deemed to be 
“an appropriate balance between revenues generated by the tax and 
accounting for the differential DST impact for businesses with different profit 
margins.”65 
However, since the EU released the above two proposals in March 2018, 
members states of the EU disagreed on both the long-term and short-term 
proposals.66 The European Council finally rejected both proposals in March 
2019.67 After the epic fail of the EU proposals, a number of member states 
have moved fast to implement their own unilateral measures for taxing the 
digital economy, discussed in the next Subpart.  
 
C.  DSTs as Popular Unilateral Measures 
After the failure to either adopting a new DST or modifying income tax 
by expanding the definition of permanent establishment, several EU member 
states have taken various levels of unilateral action. The unilateral measures 
are surprisingly skewed towards introducing a new DST, rather than 
modifying income tax rules. 68  Non-European countries, such as India, 
Mexico, and Canada, also have adopted or plan to introduce a DST. This 
 
62 Id. at 24–25. 
63 See Id. at 25; see also Council Directive 2014/65, Annex 5, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349 
(EC). 
64 EU Digital Services Tax Proposal 2018, supra note 17, at 25–26. 
65 Id. at 22. 
66  See SEAN LOWRY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45532, DIGITAL SERVICES TAXES 
(DSTS): POLICY AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 6 (2019). 
67  See Robert Van der Jagt, ECOFIN Discusses Digital Tax and Updates the EU 
Blacklist, KPMG (last visited Feb. 16, 2020), 
https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2019/05/etf-404-ecofin-discusses-eu-digital-
services-tax1.html; see also Outcome of the Council Meeting Economic and Financial 
Affairs (EC) No. 7368/19 of 12 Mar. 2015 (PR CO 12) 6.   
68 As of January 30, 2020, only four countries—Belgium, India, Israel, and Slovakia—
have introduced, or plan to introduce, a concept of “digital permanent establishment.” 
KPMG, TAXATION OF THE DIGITALIZED ECONOMY, DEVELOPMENT SUMMARY 4 (Jan. 30, 
2020), https://tax.kpmg.us/content/dam/tax/en/pdfs/2020/digitalized-economy-taxation-
developments-summary.pdf.  
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Subpart explores the most noteworthy DSTs in Europe and other countries, 
which can serve as a preliminary exercise to understand the implications of 
DSTs on the international tax policy and identify common key features of 
DSTs discussed in Part II.     
 
1. United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom is one of the early adopters of a unilateral DST, 
although it maintains its official position as waiting for the global solution 
for taxing the digital economy.69  
As part of his 2018 budget, Chancellor Philip Hammond of the United 
Kingdom released a DST proposal that resembles the EC’s March 2018 
version apart from a reduced rate and the introduction of safe harbors for 
businesses with low profit margins or those taking losses.70 The UK proposal 
would apply a 2% tax, instead of 3% tax suggested in the EC’s version, on 
the revenues of specific digital business models where the revenues are linked 
to the participation of the UK users.71 The first major change from the EC 
version is the implementation of an exemption to the tax for the first ₤25 
million in taxable UK revenues and a 0% tax rate for companies making 
losses.72   
The proposed tax would apply to business models that have revenues 
linked to the participation of UK users and is meant to apply specifically to 
(i) search engines, (ii) social media platforms, and (iii) online marketplaces.73 
Financial and payment services, the provision of online content, sales of 
software and hardware, and broadcasting services would not be within its 
scope.74 The proposed tax would require businesses within its scope to earn 
 
69 United Kingdom still states that its legislating for DST is an interim measure. See HM 
TREASURY, DIGITAL SERVICES TAX: RESPONSE TO THE CONSULTATION 7–8 (2019), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_da
ta/file/816389/DST_response_document_web.pdf [hereinafter, HM TREASURY, DST]. 
70  See HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2018 44 (2018), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/budget-2018-documents/budget-2018 
[hereinafter, HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2018]. 
71  HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2018 DIGITAL SERVICES TAX (2018), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_da
ta/file/752172/DST_web.pdf [hereinafter, HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2018 DST]. 
72 Daniel Bunn, Revenue Estimates for Digital Services Tax, TAX FOUND. (Apr. 26, 
2019), https://taxfoundation.org/digital-services-tax-revenue-estimates/. However, it is 
criticized that the safe harbors are available to almost no businesses. Philip Hammond, UK’s 
chief financial minister, stated that the tax “will be carefully designed to ensure it is 
established tech giants – rather than our tech start-ups - that shoulder the burden of this new 
tax.” https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/budget-2018-philip-hammonds-speech. 
73 HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2018, supra note 70, at 44. 
74 See HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2018 DST, supra note 71. 
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annually at least ₤500 million globally to be taxable.75 The proposal also 
includes a local revenue threshold for “relevant UK revenues” of ₤25 million, 
as a means to ensure small businesses remain outside the scope of the tax.76 
In July, 2019, the UK introduced draft legislation for their DST that 
would take effect beginning April 1, 2020.77 Uniquely, the draft legislation 
will provide a 50% reduction in the tax for instances where the tax would 




France is another country leading the unilateral change, following the 
EU’s epic fail in March 2019. In the same month of March of 2019, the 
French Finance Minister, Bruno Le Maire, released a policy document 
detailing the country’s unilateral approach to the DST.79 French DST is keen 
to tax the American tech giants, such as GAFA, the acronym of Google, 
Apple, Facebook, and Amazon, because, as the French finance minister 
Bruno Le Maire said, the emergence of such tech giants are monopolistic and 
they “not only control the maximum amount of [user] data, but also escape 
fair taxes.”80 
The proposal would subject digital businesses to a 3% tax on income 
derived from: (i) the provision of a digital interface to enable users of 
platforms to interact with each other in order to exchange goods or service, 
(ii) advertising conducted on digital interface, and (iii) resale and 
management of personal data for advertising purposes.81 To qualify for the 
above-listed income subject to DST, digital services must be made or 
supplied to French users located in France. 82  The user’s location is 




77 HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, Introduction of the New Digital Services Tax, GOV.UK 
(July 11, 2019), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/introduction-of-the-new-
digital-services-tax/introduction-of-the-new-digital-services-tax; HM TREASURY, BUDGET 
2018, supra note 70, at 43.  
78 Id. 
79  KPMG, FRANCE: DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR DIGITAL SERVICES TAX (Mar. 6, 2019), 
https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2019/03/tnf-france-draft-proposal-for-digital-
services-tax.html. 
80 Liz Alderman, France Moves to Tax Tech Giants, Stoking Fight With White House, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/11/business/france-digital-
tax-tech-giants.html. 
81 KPMG, supra note 68, at 8.  
82 Jessie Gaston, Tax Alert: French Digital Services Tax (“DST”), DENTONS (July 15, 
2019), https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/articles/2019/july/15/french-digital-services-
tax-dst. 
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sites, which differs from the industry standard’s user-click criteria.83 The 
French DST includes its own criteria in applying the tax only to companies 
earning at least €750 million in worldwide revenue and €25 million in 
domestic revenue.84  
The discussion in the legislative body moved quickly. 85  After four 
months after the discussion began, President Emmanuel Macron signed the 
new tax bill into law on July 24, 2019.86 It is expected to raise €500 million 
per year.87  
Although France is the second country that introduced a DST, the new 
tax bill retroactively established the tax to tax revenues generated from 
January 1, 2019,88 which chronologically makes France the first country to 
impose a DST. The retroactivity of the new digital tax sparkled strong 
resistance from American tech giants, such as Facebook and Amazon, 
arguing that “in order to comply, a company has to keep track of every user 
that observed an impression on a device while in France, and every user who 
observed an impression on a device everywhere in the world, back to Jan. 1, 
2019.”89 Recognizing the severe pushback, President Macron assured that 
French DST is an interim measure and that “France will reimburse any tax 
paid under its digital services tax once there is an international deal on digital 
taxation.”90 
Despite the French conciliatory gesture, it is possible that this new tax 
will escalate to a trans-Atlantic trade war. The U.S. Trade Representative 
proposed tariffs of up to 100% on French luxuries, such as wine, cosmetics, 
and handbags, claiming that French DST targets American tech giants.91 
 
83 Id.  
84 KPMG, supra note 68.  
85 On April 9, 2019, the National Assembly, France’s lower house, passed a bill nearly 
mirroring the March 2019 proposal and the Senate, upper house, amended the bill with a 
number of important changes in May of 2019. KPMG, FRANCE: UPDATE ON DIGITAL 
SERVICES TAX; ENACTMENT ANTICIPATED (Jun. 27, 2019), 
https://home.kpmg/us/en/home/insights/2019/06/tnf-france-update-on-digital-services-tax-
enactment-anticipated.html. The French Senate approved the new tax on July 11, 2019. 
Daniel Bunn, France Approves Digital Services Tax; U.S. Explores Retaliatory Options, 
TAX FOUND. (Jul. 11, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/france-digital-services-tax-us-
retaliatory-options/; Alderman, supra note 80. 
86 Hamza Ali, France’s Macron Signs Digital Services Tax Into Law, BLOOMBERG TAX 
(Jul. 25, 2019, 4:52 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report-
international/frances-macron-signs-digital-services-tax-into-law.   
87 Alderman, supra note 80.  
88 Id.  
89 Alex M. Parker, Facebook, Amazon Blast French Digital Tax in USTR Hearing, 
LAW360 (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.law360.com/tax/articles/1188541.  
90 Matt Thomson, French Digital Tax to Be Repaid After Int'l Deal, Macron Says, 
LAW360 (Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.law360.com/tax/articles/1192446.  
91 Parker, supra note 12.  
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France warned that it would retaliate with its own round of tariffs.92 For now, 
the two countries agreed to cool off while awaiting the global deal in the 
G20/OECD expected in late 2020, but it is plausible that France will not 
repeal the DST, regardless of the outcome of the global deal.93 
 
3. Other EU Member States 
 
There are a number of other European countries that also plan to adopt 
DSTs mimicking the original EU DST proposals.   
On May 16, 2018, Italy began a public consultation in response to the 
EC’s March 2019 DST proposals.94 This public consultation eventually lead 
to the introduction of Italy’s own DST, which is modelled directly off the 
EC’s version on Dec. 31, 2018.95 Italy’s DST includes the same 3% rate, 
applicable digital businesses, and worldwide revenue threshold, but modifies 
a domestic threshold into €5.5 million in Italian revenues.96 The Italian DST 
is effective from January 1, 2020.97 
Very similar to the Italian DST, Spain released a preliminary draft bill for 
a DST on Oct. 23, 2018, that closely mirrors the EC version.98 Spain’s DST 
would apply the same 3% tax rate and €750 million global threshold.99 
Similarly, the tax would apply to online advertising services, online 
intermediation services, and data transfer services, but include several 
specific exceptions and does not include an exclusion for intra-group 
transactions.100 The draft proposal also included a lower domestic threshold 
of €3 million.101 However, since then, a new government has been formed, 
and it is unclear whether the new government would introduce a similar 
 
92 David Keohane, Chris Giles & James Politi, France Warns US Against Digital Tax 
Retaliation, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/de451a5e-2fb6-11ea-
9703-eea0cae3f0de. 
93 Alex M. Parker & Todd Buell, US, France Fend Off Tariffs Over Digital Tax Issue, 
LAW360 (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1236309.  
94 Robert Sledz, Italy Enacts Budget Law 2019, Laying Groundwork for Digital Services 
Tax, THOMSON REUTERS (Jan. 10, 2019), https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/blog/italy-enacts-
budget-law-2019-laying-groundwork-for-digital-services-tax/. 
95 See id., see also legge 30 dicembre 2018, n. 145, in Official Journal of the General 
Series Dec. 31, 2018, n. 302 (It.). 
96 Sledz, supra note 94. 
97 KPMG, supra note 68, at 11.  
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budget bill that includes a DST.102 
The Austrian DST has a narrower scope than the other DST proposals, 
because it limits the scope to digital advertisement services. The Austrian 
Finance Ministry published its own digital tax draft legislation on Apr. 4, 
2019, that would expand its current advertising tax to apply to digital 
advertising.103 This more confined version of the DST would implement a 
5% turnover tax on revenue derived from advertising services in Austria and 
includes the same €750 million global threshold and a €25 million domestic 
threshold.104 The Austrian DST is effective from  January 1, 2020.105 
Table 1 below summarizes and compares various DSTs that EU member 
states have enacted or proposed to implement.  
 
TABLE 1. VARIOUS DSTS OF EU MEMBER STATES106 
 
 Threshold107 Scope Rate Effective 











Same above 3% 2019 
Italy €750/5.5 
million 
Same above 3% 2020 
Spain €750/3 
million 















102 KPMG, supra note 68, at 15.  
103  KPMG, AUSTRIA: UPDATE ON PROPOSALS FOR DIGITAL SERVICES TAX (Jul. 12, 
2019), https://home.kpmg/us/en/home/insights/2019/07/tnf-austria-update-proposals-
digital-services-tax.html. 
104 Id.  
105 KPMG, supra note 68, at 5.  
106 Table 1 is created by the author based on the survey performed by KPMG. KPMG, 
supra note 68.  
107 The first amount refers to the global revenue threshold, and the second amount refers 
to the domestic revenue threshold.  
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Advertisement  5% 2020 
Hungary HUF 100 
million 
Advertisement  7.5% 2017 
 
   
4. Beyond Europe: DST as Status Quo  
 
In addition to the EU member states, many countries, ranging from 
Canada108 to other countries in all continents, have enacted, proposed, or 
publicly discussed DSTs. Chart 1 below shows the current status of the DST 
legislation in various countries as of January 2020. 
 
CHART 1. CURRENT STATUS OF DST LEGISLATION109 
 
108 After the election in late 2019, Canada has expressed its intent to introduce a 3% DST 
for certain digital industries, which mimics the French DST. The global revenue threshold 
amount is CAD 1 billion and local revenue threshold is CAD 40 million. OFFICE OF THE 
PARLIAMENTARY BUDGET OFFICER, COST ESTIMATE OF ELECTION CAMPAIGN PROPOSAL 
(Sept. 29, 2019), https://www.pbo-
dpb.gc.ca/web/default/files/Documents/ElectionProposalCosting/Results/32977970_EN.pe
df?timestamp=1569835806287 (Can.).  
109 Chart 1 is created by the author based on the data released by KPMG. KPMG, supra 
note 68. Below is the list of countries in Chart 1. 
Countries where DST has been implemented, colored in red: Austria, Costa Rica, 
France, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Taiwan, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Vietnam, Zimbabwe.  
Countries that has proposed or publicly consider DST, colored in yellow: Belgium, 
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Israel, Latvia, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, 
Russia, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, United Kingdom.    
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About thirty-five countries have followed suit and either enacted, 
proposed, or considered a DST. Michael Graetz commented at a recent 
conference that the current nexus and profit allocation rules are no longer 
status quo; status quo has become each country unilaterally adopting its own 
DST without coordination.110 
There are two countries whose DSTs show notable variations from the 
general features discussed in Part II.A. below: India and Turkey. India has 
undertaken two significant unilateral actions in taxing the digital economy 
since 2016. First, as part of the Indian Government’s Finance Act of 2016,111 
the country introduced a turnover-based tax designated as a “equalisation 
levy,”112 which is comparable to DST. Second, in 2018, following India’s 
participation and review of the OECD’s BEPS continuing research, the 
country also expanded the definition of PE in its income tax statute to include 
digital companies that would otherwise not be taxed due to its lack of physical 
 
110 Michael Graetz, Professor of Tax Law, Columbia Law School, Speech at the 2019 
USCIB/OECD International Tax Conference (June 3, 2019).  
111 Finance Act, 2016, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 2016 (India).  
112 Finance Act, 2016, No. 2 Sec. 165(1), Acts of Parliament, 2016 (India). The Finance 
Act followed from India reacting relatively quickly to the OECD’s BEPS Action Report 1 
that recommended an equalisation levy as one of three potential solutions to taxing the digital 
economy. OECD, BEPS ACTION 1, supra note 7, at 12. The act imposes 6% turnover tax on 
the gross revenues of foreign online advertising companies that do not have traditional PE in 
India. However, the levy is only applicable to those transactions that aggregates to more than 
INR 100,000 (approximately USD 1,500) in a financial year. The specified services subject 
to the equalization levy may be expanded in scope, and are defined as “an online 
advertisement, any provision for digital advertising space or any other facility or service for 
the purpose of online advertisement and includes any other services as notified by the Central 
Government.” The levy came into effect as of June 1, 2016. Finance Act, 2016, No. 2 Secs. 
164(i), 165(1), 163(2), Acts of Parliament, 2016 (India). 
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presence in India.113 Hence, India has adopted both consumption tax-based 
solution and income tax-based solution.  
Turkey will become the latest country to introduce a DST.114 Turkey’s 
newly enacted 7.5% DST will take effect on March 1, 2020. It is noteworthy 
that Turkey’s DST is not only higher in tax rate than DST enacted by France 
and the UK, but also broader in scope because it applies to sales of digital 
content online as well.115  
 
D.  G20 and the OECD’s Work  
While many countries consider adopting a new DST unilaterally, the 
OECD and G20 has been working on a global deal to resolve the tax 
challenges in the digital economy. The OECD/G20 proposals, first released 
in early 2019 and updated in October 2019, reject the DST-based approach, 
and rather modifies the traditional income tax rules. It would allocate a digital 
firm’s income between the market countries and the firm’s home country 
based on a new formula according to sales and some online activities, 
regardless of whether the firm has physical presence in the market 
countries.116  
Aggressive tax planning strategies by multinational enterprises have been 
the center of the fiscal agenda among many countries since the financial crisis 
in 2008. 117  For example, source countries, where investments occur and 
income is produced, suffer from tax base erosion by taxpayers, whereas 
 
113 Finance Act, 2019, No. 4, Acts of Parliament, 2019 (India). India expanded the 
definition of PE by introducing the significant economic presence (“SEP”) concept in the 
amendment of the Income-tax Act. The purpose of the amendment was to establish SEP of 
foreign digital companies and tax those entities and other foreign companies with traditional 
PE alike. The SEP amendments were set to come into force April 1, 2018. Finance Act, 2019, 
No. 4 Secs. 4(2), 1(2), Acts of Parliament, 2019 (India). In sum, the SEP changes seek to 
make income attributable to any significant economic presence to be considered as taxable 
income in India. S.R. Patnaik, Taxing the Digital Economy: The Rule of ‘Significant 
Economic Presence’, CYRIL AMARCHAND MANGALDAS ADVOCS. & SOLICS. (Mar. 21, 
2018), https://tax.cyrilamarchandblogs.com/2018/03/taxing-digital-economy-rule-
significant-economic-presence/. 
114 KPMG, TURKEY: DIGITAL SERVICES TAX ENACTED, EFFECTIVE DATE OF MARCH 
2020 (Dec. 11, 2019), https://home.kpmg/us/en/home/insights/2019/12/tnf-digital-services-
tax-enacted-effective-march-2020.html. 
115 It applies to sales of digital content, which France's law excludes, and also eliminates 
other exemptions in the French legislation, such as revenue from information gathered by 
sensors. Alex M. Parker, Turkey Enacts 7.5% Digital Services Tax, LAW360 (Dec. 12, 2019), 
https://www.law360.com/tax/articles/1227913.  
116  See e.g., OECD, SECRETARIAT PROPOSAL FOR A “UNIFIED APPROACH” UNDER 
PILLAR ONE 8–9 (Oct. 9, 2019) [hereinafter OECD, UNIFIED APPROACH]. 
117 History of the G20 & BEPS, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/about/#history 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2020). 
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residence countries, where investors reside, suffer from profit shifting to low-
tax countries. In order to combat such base erosion and profit shifting 
(“BEPS”) arising from multinational enterprises’ clever use of gaps and 
mismatches in tax rules, the OECD and G20 initiated the BEPS project in 
2013, which resulted in 15 final reports containing action plans for each topic 
in 2015.118 Furthermore, the working parties realized the need to collaborate 
with more countries beyond the OECD and G20 to implement the goal of the 
BEPS project, so they created the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on 
BEPS, within which over 130 countries and jurisdictions are working 
together to tackle tax avoidance globally.119 
Among those 15 final reports and action plans, it is symbolic that Action 
1 is “Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy.”120 The report 
not only recognized the tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the 
economy but also noted that it would be “difficult, if not impossible, to ring-
fence the digital economy from the rest of the economy for tax purposes” 
because of the increasingly pervasive nature of digitalization. 121  The 
limitations addressed in Action 1 indicate the tax challenges raised by 
digitalization go beyond the base erosion or profit shifting issues, because the 
remaining challenges relate to how taxing rights among countries should be 
allocated among relevant countries. 
The G20/OECD continued to analyze the tax challenges in the digital 
economy and produced several reports with a hope to form the basis for 
consensus by 2020. The reports include the Interim Report on Tax Challenges 
Arising from Digitalization in March 2018, 122  a policy note in January 
2019,123  the Public Consultation Document in February 2019,124  and the 
Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus Solution to the Tax Challenges 
Arising from the Digitalization of the Economy (“Programme of Work”) in 
 
118 What is BEPS?, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/about/ (last visited Feb. 16, 
2020). 
119 Id.  
120 OECD, BEPS ACTION 1, supra note 7. 
121 Id. at 11. 
122 OECD, 2018 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 7, at 51. 
123  OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITALISATION OF THE 
ECONOMY – POLICY NOTE 1 (Jan. 23, 2019). This 2019 Policy Note explains that the OECD 
will examine the tax challenges under two separate pillars, while hoping to form the basis 
for consensus by 2020. Pillar 1, which is relevant to this Article, examines how to modify 
the traditional nexus and allocation rules to give market jurisdictions greater rights to assert 
tax nexus and be entitled to a share of multinational enterprises’ taxable income. Pillar 2 
seeks to further combat against the BEPS issue in the context of digitalization.123 See id. at 
2. Pillar 1 is relevant to this Article, whereas Pillar 2 seeks to extent the policy that the US 
tax reform recently adopted, especially the global intangible low-income tax (“GILTI”) 
minimum tax and the base erosion and anti-abuse tax (“BEAT”). 
124 OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 39.  
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May 2019.125 The proposals offered in these documents can be assorted into 
three categories. First is expanding the tax nexus rules to include significant 
digital presence and introducing new profit allocation rules based on 
formulae according to sales and some online activities (“Significant 
Economic Presence Proposal” or “Fractional Apportionment Method”).126 
Second is modifying profit allocation rules to reallocate an amount of income 
deriving from specific intellectual properties, called residual profit, to market 
countries (“Marketing Intangibles Proposal” or “Modified Residual Profit 
Split Method”).127 Third is modifying profit allocation rules to require an 
amount of profit be allocated to market countries where user participation is 
active, irrespective of whether the businesses have a local physical presence, 
or tax nexus (“User Participation Proposal” or “Distribution-Based 
Approaches”).128 The third proposal is the closest to DSTs with regard to 
emphasizing user participation, but is different from DSTs by sticking to the 
 
125 OECD, PROGRAMME OF WORK TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS SOLUTION TO THE TAX 
CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY (May 29, 2019).    
126 Many developing countries, such as G24, endorse this proposal. It aims to reward 
market countries by abandoning the traditional residency-based nexus rules in favor of 
economic nexus which would include digital presence. Furthermore, it adopts a formulary 
apportionment approach where the tax base is computed by applying the global profit rate of 
the multinational enterprise group to the revenue generated in a particular jurisdiction, and 
such tax base is allocated based on apportionment factors, such as sales, assets, employees, 
and importantly, users. It targets a wider scope than either of the User Participation or 
Marketing Intangibles proposals. OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 
39, at 16–17. 
127 The second proposal is supported by the United States. This proposal is similar to the 
current residual profit split method in transfer pricing, which distinguishes the multinational 
enterprises’ non-routine or residual profit from routine profit. But this proposal requires only 
a portion of the non-routine from in-scope activities or assets be allocated to the market 
jurisdiction. All other routine and non-routine profit would continue to be allocated based on 
existing profit allocation principles. See Itai Grinberg, International Taxation in an Era of 
Digital Disruption: Analyzing the Current Debate, TAXES 85, 98–101 (Mar. 2019), for a 
distinction of residual profit from routine profit. Thus, it could reach a wider scope than the 
user participation proposal, going beyond highly digitalized businesses. However, it also 
departs from the traditional arm’s-length principle, therefore making it difficult to satisfy the 
DST advocates. OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 39, at 11–16. 
128 The User Participation Proposal, supported by the UK and France, is premised on the 
idea that soliciting the sustained engagement and active participation of users is a critical 
component of value creation for certain highly digitalized businesses. The activities and 
participation of these users contribute to the creation of the brand, the generation of valuable 
data, and the development of a critical mass of users which helps to establish market power. 
Consequently, it targets certain highly digitalized businesses, such as social media platforms, 
search engines, and online marketplaces. For those businesses, non-routine or residual profit 
in excess of routine profit, which is generated from user participation, is required to be 
allocated to market countries where the relevant businesses’ active and participatory user 
bases are located, irrespective of whether the businesses have a local physical presence. 
OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 39, at 9–11. 
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income tax framework and rejecting a new DST. All three proposals attempt 
to give market countries greater taxing right, but are different as to how and 
to what extent they modify the taxing rights.   
After discussing the previous proposals, the OECD Secretariat proposed 
a “Unified Approach” in October 2019. 129  The proposal covers highly 
digitalized business models, but is increased in scope to include consumer-
facing businesses.130 It creates 1) a new nexus rule, not dependent on physical 
presence and instead largely based on sales, and 2) a new profit allocation 
rule using a formulaic approach to determine a share of residual, or non-
routine, profit allocated to market countries. 131  Although it clings to the 
income tax framework, it goes beyond the existing norm, such as arms-length 
principle—income should be allocated among relevant countries at what 
independent parties would have paid—and physical presence 
requirements.132 It aims to offer a possible consensus-based solution to be 
agreed to by the end of 2020. 
Yet, the Secretariat’s proposal is seen as “excessively cautious” and not 
enough in reforming current international tax rules for the digital economy.133 
It is a nice combination of all of the previous proposals, but at the same time 
it introduces another layer of complexity to the already-complex international 
tax rules.134 Also, it is not enough to reward the market countries: most 
corporate profits would still be taxed under current rules, and market 
countries may exercise new taxing rights only on a very small portion of 
profits that meet several thresholds. 135  If a firm does not have physical 
 
129 OECD, UNIFIED APPROACH, supra note 116.  
130 Id. at 5.  
131  The Unified Approach creates a three-tier mechanism for apportioning a 
multinational enterprise’s profits into various countries. First, Amount A is the deemed 
residual profit or deemed non-routine profit, which gets allocated among the various market 
countries even when an enterprise does not have a physical presence. Second, if the 
enterprise has a traditional tax nexus, such as physical presence, in a market country, 
additional amount—i.e., Amount B—attributed for baseline marketing and distribution 
functions may further be allocated to that country under current rules for transfer pricing and 
permanent establishment. Third, there might be a case where the market country argues that 
they may seek to tax an additional profit in excess of Amount B—i.e., Amount C—due to 
extra functions in that country. Then, the dispute over Amount C between the market country 
and the taxpayer should be subject to a legally binding and effective dispute prevention and 
resolution mechanism. Id. at 8–9. 
132 Id.; Alex M. Parker, Mnuchin Has 'Serious Concerns' With OECD Digital Tax Plan, 
LAW360 TAX AUTHORITY (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.law360.com/tax/articles/1225261.  
133 Isabel Gottlieb, OECD’s Global Tax Overhaul Too Cautious, Trade Union Group 
Says, BLOOMBERG LAW DAILY TAX REPORT (Feb. 5, 2020), https://bit.ly/2Hb0a3u. 
134 Id. 
135 See e.g., Jeroen Lammers, OECD Unified Approach Leaves Market Jurisdictions Out 
in the Cold, TAX NOTES INT’L (Jan. 13, 2020), https://bit.ly/2w3PS33. 
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presence, the new taxing rights are further limited.136  
Furthermore, it becomes unclear whether a global deal can be reached on 
the Secretariat’s proposal, because the United States recently withdrew its 
support.137 U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin sent the OECD a latter 
in December 2019, expressing concerns that the proposal departs too far from 
the existing rules, and asked to add a safe harbor that would allow U.S. 
companies to choose between the new and old regimes.138 The OECD have 
dismissed the idea of alternative safe harbor,139 and there is no sign of a 
compromise.   
Thus, many countries are more likely to maintain DSTs even after 2020, 
which has been implied by the UK, French, and German government 
officials.140 Also, Austria and Italy confirmed again in October 2019 that they 
intend to introduce a new DST from January 1, 2020.141 The current status 
confirms an earlier observation of Michael Graetz that the existing global tax 
norms in income taxation, such as nexus and profit allocation, are outdated, 
and that DSTs are status quo. To better understand DSTs, Part II analyzes 
how positive law provides DSTs as common key features and critically 
evaluates merits and demerits of DSTs compared to conventional income-tax 
based approaches.   
 
II.  THE ANATOMY OF DST 
This Part starts with how positive law provides DSTs by showing key 
design features that are common in various DSTs that have been enacted or 
proposed, explored in Part I.C. An important feature of DST is that it is 
designed as a turnover tax, which is a subcategory of consumption tax. Given 
the goal of DST is to reward market countries’ tax revenue, a consumption 
tax-based approach is considered effective because it taxes digital platforms 
in a way that the traditional income tax rules cannot. However, because of 
such departure from the conventional global norm of taxing profits of 
multinational enterprises in income tax framework, DSTs are subject to 
 
136 Supra note 131. 
137  Parker, supra note 132; Rochelle Toplensky, How Trump’s Tariff Threats Are 
Hustling Global Tax Reform, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-
trumps-tariff-threats-are-hustling-global-tax-reform-11580726125. 
138 Id. 
139 Parker & Buell, supra note 93. 
140  Natalie Olivo, UK Digital Tax May Outlive Global Agreement, LAW360 TAX 
AUTHORITY (July 25, 2019), https://www.law360.com/tax-authority/articles/1179756; 
Isabel Gottlieb, More Unilateral Taxes Likely If OECD Talks Fail: German Official, 
BLOOMBERG LAW DAILY TAX REPORT (Feb. 3, 2020), https://bit.ly/2UAWOyG; Parker & 
Buell, supra note 93.  
141 KMPG, supra note 68, at 5, 11; EY, supra note 98. 
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criticism discussed in Subpart B. Some opponents aggressively try to 
understand DST as a disguised income tax despite what positive law provides 
as a consumption turnover tax. While these critiques contain merit and need 
to be addressed, the DST debate could be viewed differently when viewing 
the DST as a consumption tax, which has never been discussed seriously 
before. This Article seeks to do this which could bring a new life to the DST 
as a way of taxing the digital economy.  
 
A.  Key Features: A Positive Account of DST  
This Subpart observes how positive law offers DSTs. The doctrinal 
analysis of such design as well as criticisms of DSTs continue to Subpart B.   
 
1. Turnover Tax and Consumption Tax 
 
DSTs are all designed as a turnover tax. In the most general sense, 
turnover taxes are defined as “a tax levied on the value of the sales revenue 
of a firm,”142 rather than other commonly used tax bases such as corporate 
profits or sales price.143 Likewise, DSTs are imposed on the “gross revenue” 
of specific digital business models where revenues are linked to the 
participation of its local users.144 Some commentators interpret the DST as a 
 
142 Turnover Tax, ROUTLEDGE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (3rd Ed. 2013). Turnover 
taxes may often be distortionary because when multiple firms touch in the development of a 
product, “the total tax paid will be higher for goods passing through several firms to their 
final sale than for those which do not.” Id. This so-called “tax cascading” may result in 
further negative consequences to companies operating at a loss or with thin-margin. JOYCE 
BEEBE, RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
ON THE E.U.’S DIGITAL TAX PROPOSAL 4 (Jan. 9, 2019).  
143 See SEAN LOWRY, supra note 66, at 9 (providing that DST is “not structured as [a 
tax] on corporate profits”). Feng Wei & Jean-François Wen, The Optimal Turnover 
Threshold and Tax Rates for SMEs 3, Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 19/98 (2019). In 
accounting, turnover means the net sales amount by a business before deducting any 
expenses, whereas “profit is the residual earnings of a business after all expenses have been 
charged against net sales.” The Difference Between Turnover and Profit, ACCOUNTING 
TOOLS (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.accountingtools.com/articles/what-is-the-difference-
between-turnover-and-profit.html.  
144 See SEAN LOWRY, supra note 66, at 9, 24; see also ACCOUNTING TOOLS, supra note 
143. Turnover taxes are essentially one type of “indirect tax on private consumption 
expenditures.” Robert F. Van Brederode, A Normative Evaluation of Consumption Tax 
Design: The Treatment of the Sales of Goods Under VAT in the European Union and Sales 
Tax in the United States, 62 TAX LAWYER 1055, 1056 (2009). If not explicitly a turnover tax, 
the DST may also be considered an excise tax, which consist of “narrowly based taxes on 
consumption, levied on specific goods, services, and activities.” TAX POLICY CENTER 
BRIEFING BOOK, WHAT ARE THE MAJOR FEDERAL EXCISE TAXES, AND HOW MUCH MONEY 
DO THEY RAISE?, https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-major-federal-
excise-taxes-and-how-much-money-do-they-raise (last visited Feb. 16, 2020). 
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disguised income tax,145 but this Article observes what positive law provides 
and analyzes DST as a turnover tax.  
A turnover tax is a subcategory of a consumption tax.146 A consumption 
tax refers to a taxing system which taxpayers are taxed based on how much 
they consume rather than how much they earn income—income tax. 147 
Consumption taxes can take the form of turnover taxes, tariffs, excise taxes, 
and other taxes on consumed goods and services. 148  The amount of 
consumption matches the sales revenue of a firm, so that a turnover tax that 
is levied on the sales revenue of a firm falls under the category of 
consumption tax. 
Turnover taxes have existed for over a century, but they have recently 
become a topic of tax policy scholarship as countries have enacted or 
proposed DSTs as a turnover tax.149 Turnover taxes have been criticized in 
part simply because they “are not based on profits, measures of income, or 
any other indicator of consumption power that is targeted by most other tax 
instruments in modern developed economies.”150 Moreover, turnover taxes, 
in general, may be distortionary due to so-called “tax cascading”—that is, 
when multiple firms touch in the development of a product, “the total tax paid 
will be higher for goods passing through several firms to their final sale than 
for those which do not.”151 However, turnover taxes have broad tax base, and 
thus can bring a “large, stable source of revenue.”152 Furthermore, turnover 
taxes offer simplified compliance for taxpayers, because gross sales or 
 
145 Infra Part II.B.2. 
146 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16, at 649. (including the turnover tax as 
part of a list of consumption taxes including retail sales tax, use tax, excise tax, and gross 
income tax). 
147  Jane L. Seigendall, A Framework on Consumption Taxes and Their Impact on 
International Trade, 18 DICK. J. INT’L L. 575, 576 (2000).  
148 See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16, at 649. 
149 PWC, ECONOMIC AND POLICY ASPECTS OF DIGITAL SERVICES TURNOVER TAXES: A 
LITERATURE REVIEW (2018); see Meyer D. Rothschild, The Gross Sales, or Turnover Tax, 
13 NAT’L TAX ASS’N 180, 196–204 (1920) (discussing, in part, the place of a one percent 
turnover tax within the United States’ taxation scheme around 1920); JOHN F. DUE, INDIRECT 
TAXATION IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 118 (1970) (describing the modern use of the 
turnover tax as beginning in the Philippines with a low-rate tax on all transactions). 
150 Justin Ross, Gross Receipts Taxes: Theory and Recent Evidence, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 
6, 2016), https://taxfoundation.org/gross-receipts-taxes-theory-and-recent-evidence/. 
151 Turnover Tax, supra note 142. This tax cascading may result in further negative 
consequences to companies operating at a loss or with thin margin. JOYCE BEEBE, supra note 
142, at 4.  
152 Garrett Watson, Resisting the Allure of Gross Receipts Taxes: An Assessment of Their 
Costs and Consequences, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 6, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/gross-
receipts-tax/. 
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revenue are “relatively easier to measure, record, and verify than profit.”153 
Thus, turnover taxes have traditionally been used in the taxation of small and 
medium sized enterprises in developing nations.154 The pros and cons of 
using turnover tax for taxing the digital economy will be discussed further in 
Subpart C.2. 
 
2. Tax Rates and Revenue Threshold 
 
DSTs’ tax rates are set in between 2~7%, and they offer revenue threshold 
requirements. In other words, a firm’s global revenue from in-scope business 
models discussed in Subpart A.4. should exceed certain threshold amounts to 
trigger a DST. DSTs also offer a smaller local revenue threshold. The France 
DST requires €750 million of global revenue and €25 million of local 
revenue, and the UK DST requires £500 million of global revenue and £25 
of local revenue for threshold amounts.  
The rationales for revenue threshold requirements are to target tech giants 
that enjoy monopoly power and yet do not pay enough pay in the market 
countries.155 Furthermore, the local revenue threshold is to recognize a firm’s 
tax nexus to the market countries regardless of its physical presence, 
explained in Subpart A.3. 156  If a firm generates revenue more than the 
threshold amount in the market country, it is enough to recognize the tax 
nexus to the market countries and thus, market countries should be able to 
exercise taxing rights on the firm. These requirements are also upheld in 
Wayfair, although the tax at issue in the case is sales tax on remote sellers, 
not a turnover tax.157  
The revenue threshold requirements are criticized mainly for two reasons. 
 
153 PWC, A NEW TURNOVER TAX INTRODUCED FROM JANUARY 2013 (2013). Therefore, 
developing nations, such as South Africa and Armenia, introduced turnover taxes as an 
option to some small and medium sized enterprises. Id.  
154 See Wei & Wen, supra note 143, at 3. 
155  KPMG, FRANCE: DIGITAL SERVICES TAX (3%) IS ENACTED (July 25, 2019), 
https://home.kpmg/us/en/home/insights/2019/07/tnf-france-digital-services-tax-
enacted.html (“Tech companies allegedly have realized benefits from an undue advantage . 
. . .”); HM TREASURY & HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, DIGITAL SERVICES TAX: CONSULTATION 
22 (2018) (“The thresholds are also based on an expectation that the value derived from users 
will be more material for large digital businesses . . . .”), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_da
ta/file/754975/Digital_Services_Tax_-_Consultation_Document_FINAL_PDF.pdf; EU 
Digital Services Tax Proposal 2018, supra note 17, at 10 (supporting a global revenue 
threshold to limit application of tax to “companies of a certain scale, which are those which 
have established strong market positions that allow them to benefit relatively more from 
network effects and exploitation of big data . . . .”). 
156 EU Digital Services Tax Proposal 2018, supra note 17, at 10–11. 
157 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099.  
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First, it does not offer safe harbors for businesses in losses.158 Many digital 
firms would suffer from losses especially in their early stage of business, but 
those firms might be subject to DSTs as long as they generate large amount 
of gross revenue. To ameliorate this problem, for example, the UK DST 
proposal exempts for the first ₤25 million in taxable UK revenues and a 0% 
tax rate for companies making losses.159 Second, it is suspected that only 
American tech giants might satisfy the revenue threshold requirements and 
be subject to DSTs. This critique will be discussed in Subpart B. in details. 
 
3. New Rules for Tax Nexus and Profit Allocation 
 
As to the mechanics of recognizing tax nexus and allocating profits of 
digital firms, DSTs reject the traditional requirement of physical presence and 
arm’s length principle in income taxation. More precisely, it does not have to 
be bound by such requirements, because it is a turnover consumption tax.  
In traditional income tax framework, when a firm located in Country A 
sells goods or services in Country B (market country), profits of the firm may 
be allocated to, and subject to income tax in, Country B only if the firm has 
a tax nexus in Country B. The most notable form of the tax nexus is the firm’s 
physical presence, such as a subsidiary and a permanent establishment, in 
Country B. Once the tax nexus is recognized, the physical presence is 
considered as a related party of the firm and the global profits of the firm is 
allocated between Countries A and B based on the arm’s length principle. 
That is, the amount charged by one related party to another for a given 
product or service must be the same as if the parties were not related. The so-
determined amount of profits is allocated to Country B and subject to Country 
B’s tax jurisdiction. The limitations of the traditional approach pertaining the 
digital economy is that there is no way for Country B to collect revenue from 
a firm’s remote business if the firm does not establish a physical presence 
there.  
DSTs would in effect modify such tax nexus and profit allocation rules in 
income tax, because they require allocating profits to market countries where 
users are located, irrespective of whether the businesses have a local physical 
presence. First, DSTs do not require a physical presence to recognize a tax 
nexus in market jurisdictions. Instead, they recognize a tax nexus if, for 
example, revenue amount generated in market countries exceeds certain 
thresholds. The number of users or transactions occurred in the market 
country is also criteria to consider, which replaces the traditional physical 
presence in income tax. Second, once the tax nexus is recognized, an amount 
 
158 See Bunn, supra note 19 (“The tax would still apply even if those companies were 
not profitable, ignoring the costs associated with the revenues.”). 
159 Bunn, supra note 72.   
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of profit should be allocated to market jurisdictions in which relevant 
business’ active and participatory user bases are located, even if there is no 
local physical presence. As a result, market countries would be able to collect 
revenue from the digital economy, which was not possible under the 
traditional rules. 
 
4. Limited Scope 
 
One of the most notable features of the DSTs is their limited scope. A 
DST is designed to apply to the identified digital business models where tax 
challenges are primarily manifest with mobile IPs and significant user 
participation.160 As a result, it “ring-fences,” or segregates, such specified 
digital business models from the rest of the digital economy.161 To illustrate, 
the scope of the UK DST is limited to search engines, social media platforms, 
and online marketplaces, but excludes certain regulated financial and 
payment services, the provision of online content, sales of software/hardware, 
and television or broadcasting services. Thus, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, 
Google, Amazon Marketplace, Kayak, Priceline, Uber, and Airbnb are in 
scope, whereas PayPal, Netflix, Hulu, Spotify, and Ubisoft are excluded.162  
However, there are certain digital platforms that need further clarification 
on whether they should be within the scope of DSTs. For example, it is still 
puzzling whether LinkedIn or YouTube are considered a social media 
platform subject to a DST or a digital interface providing digital content and 
thus not subject to a DST. Also, Spotify and Netflix are currently not subject 
to a DST, but they raise another line-drawing question when they offer 
customized advertising services to their users. The scope of DSTs concerning 
the ring-fencing problem will be further discussed in Part III.C.3.   
 
B.  Criticisms on DST 
While DSTs offer benefits, they cannot escape criticism from 
 
160 EU Digital Services Tax Proposal 2018, supra note 17, at 7–10 (“DST is a tax with 
a targeted scope, levied on the revenues resulting from the supply of certain digital services 
characterized by user value creation.”); HM TREASURY & HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, supra 
note 155, at 6 (explaining that the DST is “designed to ensure digital businesses pay tax 
reflecting the value they derive from the participation of UK users” and simultaneously 
dealing with “the international tax framework’s failure to recognize this important source of 
value creation”). 
161 OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: ACTION 1 
2014 DELIVERABLE 12 (2014) (warning that the digital economy “would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to ring-fence the digital economy” by “[a]ttempting to isolate the digital 
economy as a separate sector”). 
162 Cui, supra note 2, at 8–9.  
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stakeholders. Digital firms have bluntly expressed their unhappiness with this 
new tax.163 The U.S. government also shares the same concerns held by many 
tech giants located in the United States.164  On the other hand, academic 
literature is divided: some scholars take a critical stance towards DST, while 
others are more sympathetic.165 Based on the key features discussed above, 
let us now examine the criticisms that DSTs are facing.  
 
1. “Ring-Fencing” and Discrimination  
 
First, because DST only applies to the specific digital business models, it 
has been criticized as ring-fencing, or segregating, the identified digital 
business models where tax challenges are primarily manifest with mobile IP 
and significant user participation. The proponents of other income tax-based 
proposals argue that DST is against the idea of a level playing field by 
penalizing the big or early players in the market.166   
Second, various unilateral DSTs potentially discriminate businesses 
based on nationality. 167  It has been deeply suspected that the revenue 
threshold would only be satisfied by American tech giants. On this point of 
the challenge, the United States has been a major opponent to the DST 
general concept. In the letter of January 29, 2019, by Senators Grassley and 
Wyden to US Treasury Secretary Mnuchin, copying EC and European 
Council, they expressed concern about unilateral DSTs, because they are 
"designed to discriminate against US-based multinational companies."168 In 
 
163 See Kanter, supra note 20 (including statements and actions from representatives 
from Amazon, Facebook, and Google decrying the French DST as unfair or harmful). 
164 Press Release, United States Trade Representative, USTR Announces Initiation of 
Section 301 Investigation into France’s Digital Services Tax (July 10, 2019), 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/july/ustr-
announces-initiation-section-301 (“The United States is very concerned that the digital 
services tax which is expected to pass the French Senate tomorrow unfairly targets American 
companies . . . .”). 
165 For the former position, see Bauer, supra note 27; Jessop, supra note 27; Johaness 
Becker et al., EU  Digital Services Tax: A populist and Flawed Proposal, KLUWER INT’L 
TAX BLOG (Mar. 16, 2018), kluwertaxblog.com/2018/03/16/eu-digital-services-tax-populist-
flawed-proposal/?print=pdf. For the latter position, see e.g., Cui, supra note 4; Daniel 
Shaviro, Digital Services Taxes and the Broader Shift from Determining the Source of 
Income to Taxing Location-Specific Rents 5 (NYU Law and Economics, Research Paper No. 
19-36, 2019) (stating that DSTs “have promise, not just in themselves, but as a model for 
broader rethinking of international tax policy”).  
166 Bunn, supra note 19. 
167 Ruth Mason & Leopoldo Parada, Company Size Matters, 2019 BRITISH TAX REV. 
610, 646–49 (2019); Ruth Mason & Leopoldo Parada, Digital Battlefront in the Tax Wars, 
92 TAX NOTES INT’L 1183, 1193–96 (2018).  
168 Letter from Sen. Charles E. Grassley & Sen. Ron Wyden, U.S. Senate Committee on 
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March 2019, Treasury Department Assistant Secretary for International Tax 
Affairs, Chip Harter, expressed concern that under the WTO, trade 
agreements, and treaties the French DST proposal could be challenged as 
discriminatory vis-à-vis US companies, and the US is opposed to any digital 
services tax proposals.169 In December 2019,  the U.S. Trade Representative 
proposed tariffs of up to 100% on French luxuries, such as wine, cosmetics, 
and handbags, to discourage French DST.170 France warned that it would 
retaliate with its own round of tariffs.171 For now, the two countries agreed to 
cool off while awaiting the global deal in the G20/OECD expected in late 
2020,172 but it is plausible that the DST debate would escalate to a trans-
Atlantic trade war.   
The above two criticisms raise fair concerns that need to be addressed. 
Implementing a tax that harms the growth of the new business and 
disproportionately impacts certain companies based on nationality is neither 
efficient nor fair.173  However, it is eventually an empirical question that 
requires evidence on whether the majority of the companies subject to DST 
are foreign multinationals from market jurisdictions, and yet no such data is 
available. Furthermore, the criticism is largely based on practical concerns 
and focused on the imminent impact, such as who is the winner and loser in 
the short term, that can be improved in the implementation stage. Part III 
proposes possible alternatives to improve DSTs on these points.   
 
2. Disguised Income Tax 
 
Third, some commentators argue that it is possible to interpret DST as a 
disguised direct tax, or corporate income tax, resulting in double taxation 
problem in international tax.174 The first two criticisms above contain little 
discussion of the consumption tax aspect of the DST, although the positive 
 




169 U.S. Sees Unilateral Taxes on Web Giants As ‘Discriminatory’: Treasury Official, 
REUTERS (Mar. 12, 2019, 5:09 AM), https://reuters.com/article/us-usa-tax-harter-
idUSKBN1QT1CT.  
170 Parker, supra note 12.  
171 Keohane, Giles & Politi, supra note 92.   
172 Parker & Buell, supra note 93.   
173 Bunn, supra note 19; Mason & Parada, Digital Battlefront in the Tax Wars, supra 
note 167, at 1197 (“[W]e argue[] that revenue thresholds in current digital tax proposals are 
vulnerable to nationality discrimination claims because they are intended to – and as applied 
by individual member states, likely would – burden mostly nonresident companies.”). 
174 See e.g., Ismer & Jescheck, supra note 21, at 577; EU Digital Services Tax Proposal 
2018, supra note 17. 
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law clearly provides DST as a turnover tax and consumption tax.175 In this 
regard, the third criticism offers important doctrinal implications.  
The attempt to interpret DST as income tax is largely based on the idea 
that current design of DST “departs from traditional income tax or turnover 
taxes.”176 The critiques argue that, if the goal of such unconventional DST is 
to make up the foregone revenue from traditional income tax system, the 
legislative intent may infer that DST relates to “profits” of tech giants,177 
which is the tax base of income tax.178 The fact that the technical tax base is 
gross revenues does not necessarily negate the suspicion of income taxation 
because other direct taxes, such as withholding tax as a collection mechanism 
of income tax, are also levied on gross profits.179 The taxable period of DST 
is also a yearly basis, rather than per transaction basis, which is more similar 
to direct taxation than indirect taxation.     
Interpreting DST as income tax may result in double taxation problem in 
international tax.180 Double taxation on certain income may occur when two 
or more countries concurrently contribute to that income. One country might 
contribute to the income as a residence country of a taxpayer, and another 
country might contribute to the same income as a source country where the 
taxpayer deploys investment. However, if the two countries claim to collect 
tax on the same income, double taxation occurs. Thus, countries enter into 
income tax treaties with their major trading partners to eliminate such double 
 
175 Lack of analysis on the consumption tax aspect of a DST is largely due to the EU’s 
single consumption tax policy, where only one type of consumption tax—i.e., VAT—may 
exist in the EU. Article 401 of Directive 2006/112/EC (“the VAT Directive”). Thus, policy 
papers in the EU often explain that a DST is a lumpsum tax to compensate a loss of corporate 
tax revenue. See e.g., EU Digital Services Tax Proposal 2018, supra note 17, at 10. However, 
such EU policy for single consumption tax cannot prevent the scholars from constructing 
DST as a consumption tax, both doctrinally and normatively. 
176 Ismer & Jescheck, supra note 21, at 577. 
177 Id. at 575. 
178 Income tax is classified as a direct tax, whereas a turnover tax is classified as an 
indirect tax. See Henry Ordower, Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation as 
Constitutional Principles: Germany and the United States Contrasted, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 259, 
267–68 (2006).  
179 Withholding tax is a tax levied on income, such as wages and certain income of 
nonresident aliens, that a payor withholds from the payment and pays directly to the 
government. See e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1441, 3402. For example, “fixed or determinable, annual or 
periodic” income of nonresident aliens is usually subject to a 30% withholding tax on the 
gross amount paid. Harvey P. Dale, Withholding Tax on Payments to Foreign Persons, 36 
TAX L. REV. 49, 59 (1980). 
180 If the DST is a direct tax, there is a risk that a DST is within the scope of “Taxes 
Covered” in Article 2 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital. Such 
risk leads to the treaty-level concern of double taxation. OECD MODEL art.2, supra note 3.   
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taxation problem.181  When a state exercises primary taxing rights on certain 
income based on the rule set by an income tax treaty, the other contracting 
state should concede to the first state’s taxing rights and exercise residual 
taxing rights or offer measures to eliminate double taxation on the same 
income, such as a foreign tax credit or an exemption from tax.182  
Putting the double taxation problem in the DST debate, a digital firm’s 
profits, including those generated from market countries, have been subject 
to corporate income tax in the firm’s residence country. Now, however, 
market countries are introducing a DST on the firm’s gross revenue generated 
from the market country. From the firm’s perspective, it now faces two 
different taxes to two different countries, respectively.183 
However, the double taxation problem does not occur if two taxes are 
imposed on different tax bases. For example, many countries impose VAT 
on a business’s consumption, or gross margin, and at the same time they 
impose corporate income tax on the business’s net income.184 Although the 
tax base of VAT and that of corporate income tax are not exactly the same, 
they may significantly overlap. However, this is not double taxation, because 
VAT is imposed on taxpayer’s consumption whereas corporate income tax is 
imposed on the taxpayer’s net income. The same explanation upholds for 
DST. The positive law clearly states that the tax base of DST is gross revenue 
of certain digital firms. This is different from the tax base of income tax, 
which is net income after deducting expenses from gross revenue. Thus, 
accusing the DST of creating a double taxation problem is not likely a 
legitimate concern as long as DST is interpreted as a turnover tax.185  
 
181 See e.g., U.S. Model pmbl. (“The Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of __, intending to conclude a Convention for the elimination of double 
taxation with respect to taxes on income . . . .”). 
182 Rebecca M. Kysar, Interpreting Tax Treaties, IOWA L. REV. 1378, 1393–94 (2016). 
183 Ismer & Jescheck, supra note 21, at 574. 
184 For example, a toy manufacturer located in a country having a 10% VAT and 20% 
corporate income tax. The toy manufacturer buys the raw materials for $4.00, plus a VAT of 
$0.40—payable to the government—for a total price of $4.40. The manufacturer then sells 
the toy to a retailer for $10.00 plus a VAT of $1.00 for a total of $11.00. However, the 
manufacturer renders only 60 cents to the government, which is the total VAT at this point, 
minus the prior VAT charged by the raw material supplier. Note that the 60 cents also equals 
10% of the manufacturer’s gross margin of $6.00. In addition, the toy manufacturer should 
pay corporate income tax on its net income of $6.00, which is the gross revenue of $10.00 
minus deductible expenses for the raw materials of $4.00, at 20% corporate income tax rate, 
which is a total of $12.00 corporate income tax. This example shows that tax base of VAT 
and corporate income tax may significantly overlap, but it is still not considered as double 
taxation.  
185 Ismer & Jescheck, supra note 21, at 575, 577 (conceding that the DST enacted as 
either a Member State tax or “a real ‘EU tax’” would bring the DST  outside the scope of 
taxes covered by income tax treaties, while still maintaining that it is unclear how the court 
would classify DSTs). 
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Furthermore, interpreting DST as income tax may not always promote 
the national interest of the United States. American tech giants have 
complained about their increased overall tax liability due to new DSTs, 
because both market countries and home countries of tech giants can impose 
tax on such tech giants by bypassing the double tax issues—the former 
imposes a turnover tax, and the latter imposes income tax. On the other hand, 
if DST is interpreted as disguised income tax, it results in double taxation, 
which must be avoided as per the mandate by income tax treaties. A plausible 
solution would be for home countries, or residence countries, of the firms to 
allow to foreign tax credit for such DST paid to market countries, or source 
countries.186 In the DST debate, the American digital firms would claim 
foreign tax credit against the corporate tax liability payable to the U.S. 
government. In other words, interpreting DST as income tax might decrease 
American tech giants’ worldwide tax liability, but it may open a possibility 
to reduce the U.S. tax revenue.187  
The issue of doctrinal interpretation of DST as income tax or 
consumption tax might have implications on the potential trade war. If a DST 
is considered as income tax rather than a turnover-based consumption tax, it 
could fall under the Direct Tax Exception in art. XIV of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs in Services (GATS).188 The detailed analysis of the 
 
186 The UK DST proposal recognizes this potential foreign tax credit issue and provides 
that DST will not be within the scope of the UK’s double tax treaties, it will not be creditable 
against UK Corporate Tax. HM TREASURY & HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, supra note 155, at 
29, 32. 
187 Even if DSTs are interpreted as income tax, it might be challenging for tech giants to 
successfully claim foreign tax credit for DSTs due to complicated requirements for foreign 
tax credit. However, it is noteworthy that recent Opinions of Advocate General regarding 
Hungarian DSTs consistently holds that Hungarian DST constitutes a turnover-based special 
income tax in order to bypass the single consumption tax policy of the EU, discussed in supra 
note 175. Fővárosi Közigazgatási és munkaügyi bíróság [Budapest Administrative and Labor 
Court] July 4, 2019, C-323/18 (Hung.); Fővárosi Közigazgatási és munkaügyi bíróság 
[Budapest Administrative and Labor Court] June 13, 2019, C-75/18 (Hung.); Fővárosi 
Közigazgatási és munkaügyi bíróság [Budapest Administrative and Labor Court] Sept. 12, 
2019, C-482/12 (Hung.). The opinions of the Advocates General are advisory and do not 
bind the Court, but they are nonetheless very influential and are followed in the majority of 
cases. PAUL CRAIG AND GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW, TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 70 
(5th ed., 2011). If that is the case, it would be wise for the U.S. government to consider the 
foreign tax credit issue more seriously.  
188 General Agreement on Trade and Services art. XIV(d), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 
(1994) [hereinafter GATS]; Mitchel et al., Taxing Tech: Risks of an Australian Digital 
Services Tax under International Economic Law, 20 MELB. J. INT’L L. 88, 105 (2019); PWC, 
A WHITE PAPER ANALYZING THE EU’S 2018 PROPOSED DIGITAL SERVICES TAX (INTERIM 
MEASURE) UNDER WTO LAW 14-15 (2019), https://thesuite.pwc.com/media/10060/dst-
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GATS’ direct tax exception is beyond the scope of this Article; but some 
might find it more beneficial to interpret DST as a consumption tax if they 
would like to hold the cards that could be used in a potential trade law dispute.  
As discussed above, the attempt to doctrinally interpret DST as income 
tax is arguably based on its unconventionality. However, it is not fully 
convincing why as a result DST should be interpreted as income tax 
notwithstanding that positive law clearly provides it as a turnover tax. What 
is unconventional is the new digital economy that gives birth to DSTs; but 
the design of DST itself is a conventional turnover-based consumption tax. 
The tax base of DST is clearly different from that of income tax, and it is well 
established that significant overlap of tax base between consumption tax and 
income tax is not considered double taxation. Perhaps a blunt motivation for 
this doctrinal analysis would be the global revenue competition by states who 
cannot easily ignore the complaint of tech giants for the increased tax burden. 
However, the above discussion infers that interpreting DST as income tax 
might not serve the best interest of the home countries of such tech giants that 
are arguably losing in the revenue competition.  
Then, the discussion develops into the next phase: normatively, should 
we construct DST as income tax? Put it more generally, is income tax-based 
solution better than consumption tax-based solution? If the answer would be 
the negative, what are the benefits of constructing DST as a consumption tax? 
The next Subpart deals with such normative discussion that has been 
neglected in the DST debate.  
 
C.  Should We Stick To Income-Tax Based Solution?  
DST has been gaining more political impetus in many countries as a 
solution for the tax challenges in the digital economy, becoming the new 
status quo.189 It is designed as a turnover tax imposed on gross revenue, and 
therefore, by definition, it is a subcategory of consumption tax. On the other 
hand, there are still ongoing efforts to propose a global solution based on 
traditional income tax framework, either by modifying current income tax 
rules or interpreting DST as income tax.190 Such DST debate reminds of the 
traditional debate on the normative superiority between consumption tax and 
income tax. But the DST debate shows variation from the old debate between 
consumption tax and income tax as it relates to a cross-border taxation in the 
 
under-wto-law.pdf. The definition of direct taxes under the GATS encompasses “all taxes on 
total income, on total capital or on elements of income or of capital, including taxes on gains 
from the alienation of property, taxes on estates, inheritances and gifts, and taxes on the total 
amounts of wages or salaries paid by enterprises, as well as taxes on capital appreciation.” 
GATS art. XXVIII(o).  
189 Supra Part I.C. 
190 Supra Parts I.D. and II.B.2.  
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digital era while the old debate largely focuses on domestic taxation. This 
Subpart gives an overview of the old debate between consumption tax and 
income tax and offers a new perspective on the DST debate: a consumption 
tax-based DST can be a suitable tax policy to solve tax challenges of the 
digital economy if the concerns in the existing design are mitigated.  
 
1. Old Debate: Consumption Tax v. Income Tax 
 
A consumption tax is a tax on the purchase of goods or services.191 In a 
broader sense, consumption tax refers to a taxing system where people are 
taxed based on how much they consume rather than how much they add to 
the economy, such as under an income tax.192 Examples of a consumption tax 
include retail sales taxes, excise taxes, value added taxes, use taxes, import 
duties, and most importantly for this paper, turnover taxes or taxes on gross 
business receipts.193  
Consumption taxes are generally born by consumers because vendors 
charge a higher price for the good or service to account for the amount of 
consumption tax.194 The vendor then remits the tax to the appropriate federal, 
state, or local government. 
Proponents of a consumption tax argue that it encourages saving and 
investment, which makes the economy more efficient, whereas an income tax 
penalizes savers and rewards spenders.195 Thus, they argue that it is fairer to 
tax those who take out of the limited resource pool through consumption, 
rather than what they contribute to the pool using their income. On the other 
hand, opponents argue that a consumption tax adversely affects the poor who, 
by necessity, spend a higher percentage of their income. 196  Since 
 
191 Anne L. Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal Case Against Income and Wealth Transfer 
Taxation: A Response to Professor McCaffery, 51 TAX L. REV. 363 (1996) (“A consumption 
tax, by definition, taxes only income spent on current, personal consumption (for example, 
on cars, food and travel).”). 
192 See Alvin Warren, Would A Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than An Income Tax?, 89 
YALE L.J. 1081, 1083–84 (1980) (citing generally H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 
59-102 (1983)). 
193 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16, at 649. (including the turnover tax as 
part of a list of consumption taxes including retail sales tax, use tax, excise tax, and gross 
income tax). 
194 This concept is called “tax incidence.” See infra Part III.C.1. See also TAX POLICY 
CENTER BRIEFING BOOK, WHO BEARS THE BURDEN OF A NATIONAL RETAIL SALES TAX?, 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/who-bears-burden-national-retail-sales-tax 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2020). 
195  Martin A. Sullivan, Introduction: Getting Acquainted With VAT, in THE VAT 
READER WHAT A FEDERAL CONSUMPTION TAX WOULD MEAN FOR AMERICA 12 (2011), 
http://www.taxhistory.org/www/freefiles.nsf/Files/VATReader.pdf/$file/VATReader.pdf. 
196 Id. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3578348
42 Digital Services Tax  [30-Mar-20 
consumption tax is a form of regressive tax, the wealthy population consumes 
a smaller fraction of their income than poorer households do.197 On the other 
hand, the income tax is justified as more progressive due to ability to pay 
being determined through levels of income.198 
Overall, consumption tax has strength in efficiency and administrability, 
whereas income tax has merits in equity. In terms of efficiency, an income 
tax effectively reduces the value of future consumption relative to present 
consumption by discriminating against savings, creating a deadweight 
loss.199 On the other hand, a consumption tax improves efficiency by treating 
savings at a more neutral standpoint, allowing for “greater individual savings 
and investment, capital formation, and ultimately greater economic 
productivity.”200 As for administrability, the strength of the consumption tax 
in modern tax dialogue can be more readily seen from the reduced complexity 
that would occur in replacing an income tax with a consumption tax.201 
Proponents of the consumption tax point to the complexity of income taxes 
in inconsistently treating certain categories of income, such as the different 
tax treatment between savings from ordinary income and increases in wealth 
through appreciation.202 
In international tax, scholars have greater focus on efficiency and 
administrability over equity or fairness.203  International tax literature has 
been described as having a “narrow normative focus” which is “guided by 
worldwide economic efficiency [] concerned with increasing economic 
output and reducing deadweight loss, wherever it occurs.”204  In contrast, 
domestic tax, especially personal income tax, tend to focus more heavily on 
concerns over equity and fairness.205 Relying on international concerns of 
taxation focused more heavily on economic principles, especially efficiency, 
the consumption tax is likely to have an advantage over income tax in 
 
197 Id. 
198 See Daniel S. Goldberg, The U.S. Consumption Tax: Evolution, Not Revolution, 57 
TAX LAWYER 1 (2003); see also Warren, supra note 192, at 1092–93. 
199 William D. Andrews, A Consumption or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. 
L. REV. 1113, 1113–14 (1974). 
200 Goldberg, supra note 198, at 21. 
201 See Chris R. Edwards, Simplifying Federal Taxes: The Advantages of Consumption-
Based Taxation, CATO INST. (Oct. 17, 2001), 
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa416.pdf (providing a detailed list of 
income tax complexities that could be eliminated in implementing a consumption tax). 
202 Andrews, supra note 199, at 1115. 
203 See e.g., David L. Forst, The U.S. International Tax Treatment of Partnerships: A 
Policy-Based Approach, 14 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 239, 250 (1996) (“equity has more recently 
been considered as ‘irrelevant’ to contemporary international tax policy, and the more recent 
literature primarily focuses on economic principles.”) (footnote omitted). 
204 Graetz, supra note 50, at 280.  
205 See Id. at 276.  
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addressing efficient deployment of global capital of multinational enterprises. 
This insight may apply to the new debate on DST, discussed below.  
2. New Debate: DST vs. Income Tax-Based Proposals  
 
The DST discussion largely occurs in cross-border business transactions. 
In international tax and business tax, the three traditional policy prongs—
namely, efficiency, equity, and administrability—are not equally important. 
Efficiency and administrability are more emphasized than equity in 
international tax and business tax. Thus, applying this weighted policy 
criteria may be appropriate for analyzing international taxation responses to 
digitalization. Considering that the strength of consumption tax is efficiency 
and administrability and that of income tax is equity, consumption tax-driven 
proposals may be normatively superior, at least for cross-border digitalization 
of the economy.  
Noticing the possible advantage of consumption tax in cross-border 
business transaction, this Article proposes an alternative approach to validate 
DST by envisaging it as a cross-border consumption tax, which offers the 
following merits.  
First, there is no need to make efforts to undertake the fundamental 
overhaul of nexus and allocation rules to reward more taxing rights if the goal 
of the DST debate is to reward market jurisdictions. A consumption tax is by 
nature imposed in the place where the consumption occurs; in the highly 
digitalized business model, it is the market jurisdictions where users are 
located. Thus, a consumption tax-based DST can be successful in rewarding 
market countries. Furthermore, the DST as a turnover tax is meant to make 
up for the inapplicability of traditional income tax rules that were mainly 
created for brick and mortar businesses and relying on physical presence. 
This is a very important justification for the EU using the turnover tax to deal 
with aggressive tax planning from digital companies by subjecting them to 
tax that can be implemented without following traditional tax laws.206 
Second, a solid construction of DST as a consumption tax may easily 
eliminate the double taxation concern in international tax addressed in 
Subpart B.2. Interpreting a DST as an income tax and inviting tax treaty to 
deal with potential double taxation is not wise, considering that tax treaty is 
not a good tool to deal with the tax challenges in digital economy.207     
Third, a DST, as a consumption tax, may be more efficient and 
 
206 EU Digital Services Tax Proposal 2018, supra note 17. 
207  Wei Cui, The Superiority of the Digital Services Tax Over Significant Digital 
Presence Proposals, 72 NAT’L. TAX J. 839, 840–41 (2019) (weighing the familiarity in using 
the treaty approach against the disadvantages of clinging to “superfluous conventions” and 
the restriction on the treaty framework may have on international cooperation). 
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administrable than income tax-based proposals because a consumption tax is 
superior in efficiency and administrability. The tax challenges of the 
digitalization of the economy are inevitably related to cross-border 
transactions or business taxation, where efficiency and administrability are 
more important. DST, as a turnover tax, also provides broad tax base as a 
large, stable source of revenue and simplicity to administer. 208   More 
interestingly, a DST designed as a turnover tax may overcome the general 
criticism on turnover taxes: that is, such taxes are imposed on gross revenue 
and thus, creates economic distortion due to tax cascading. 209  This tax 
cascading problem occurs when multiple firms are involved in the 
development of a product or supply chain.210 However, highly digitalized 
business models subject to DST involve a single firm or short supply chain 
functioning as platforms. Those digital firms implicate almost zero or 
negligible marginal cost when they generate revenue.211 The new features of 
the digital economy may mitigate the potential tax cascading problem 
associated with turnover taxes.212  
Fourth, as compared to income tax-based proposals, a consumption tax-
based approach might not serve equity or fairness well. However, DST may 
overcome the fairness or regressive problem with respect to individual 
taxpayers, considering that many highly digitalized businesses subject to 
DST adopt multi-sided platform models. In a multi-sided platform model, 
fees charged by digital firms are paid by another business, such as user-sellers 
or advertisers, and thus the tax incidence would be on the user-sellers or 
advertisers, not retail users.  
It is also worth noting that South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. examines the 
economic nexus rule in connection with a “sales tax,” which is an example 
of a consumption tax. Until the summer of 2018, because of the traditional 
physical presence requirement, remote online sellers did not collect sales tax 
from customers located in states where they did not have a physical presence. 
However, Wayfair Court overturned the physical presence rule in favor of an 
economic presence rule. The policy rationale in Wayfair is consistent with 
the G20/OECD’s discussion on the new tax nexus rule, which is moving 
away from strict physical presence rules. However, the decision itself is not 
strictly supportive to income tax-based proposals because the new tax nexus 
rule can be applied in the context of a consumption tax. South Dakota’s sales 
tax rules upheld in Wayfair were quite similar to the current design of the 
DST, besides the applicable tax rate. Furthermore, the Netflix Tax adopting 
 
208 Watson, supra note 152.   
209 Supra Part II.A.1. 
210 Turnover Tax, supra note 142.  
211 Cui, supra note 4, at 25–27.   
212 See infra Part III.A. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3578348
30-Mar-20] A Cross-Border Variation of the Consumption Tax Debate 45 
an economic nexus rule following Wayfair resemble DSTs. As observed in 
Wayfair, the discussion on the modern taxation of digitalized business models 
could apply to a consumption tax, such as a DST.    
 
III.  HOW TO IMPROVE DST AS A CONSUMPTION TAX 
Part II critically reviewed the critiques against DST and argued that 
constructing DST as a consumption tax could bring new life to the DST and 
taxing the digital economy. In order to do so, certain issues need to be further 
explored and improved. This Part discusses, among other topics, tax 
incidence of DST, comparison of DST with consumption taxes, and suggests 
expanding the scope of businesses subject to DST to overcome the limited 
scope. These novel discussions inspired by DST may also offer a new path 
towards a consumption tax in international taxation of the digital economy.  
 
A.  Tax Incidence of DST 
The first issue that is prominently understudied in DST debate is who 
bears the economic burden. In tax terms, the question refers to the tax 
incidence of a DST. At the early stages of DST debate, critics argued that the 
tax incidence of the DST will be borne by consumers because of the turnover 
tax design, and subsequently negatively affect the demand side of the digital 
economy. 213  However, such criticism is not convincing, considering that 
many digital business models are multi-sided. In a multi-sided business 
model, there are two types of users—user-buyer and user-seller—and the fees 
imposed by a service provider is on the user-seller side. Thus, it is not 
conceptually impossible to pass the tax incidence to user-sellers, rather than 
user-buyers.214  
In fact, since the adoption of the new French DST, Amazon announced 
that it considers the French DST a consumption tax and will “pass the tax’s 
cost to [user-sellers] on its website in France through a 3% referral fee 
increase starting Oct. 1[, 2019].”215 Thus, despite attempts of interpreting 
DST as disguised income tax, DST is applied as a consumption tax in the real 
 
213 Bauer, supra note 27; Kanter, supra note 20; Elizabeth Schulze, France’s Digital Tax 
Could Hurt Consumers More Than Tech Companies, CNBC (July 12, 2019, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/12/france-digital-tax-could-hurt-consumers-more-than-
tech-companies.html. 
214 Cui, supra note 4, at 3. 
215 Todd Buell, Amazon Raising Fees on French Sellers After Digital Tax, LAW360 
(Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1184355/amazon-raising-fees-on-french-
sellers-after-digital-tax. The referral fee is the fee that the company charges vendors for using 
Amazon to sell products. 
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world.216  
Nevertheless, although the French anecdote on tax incidence proves that 
market players perceive DST as a consumption tax, and accordingly pass the 
tax incidence to one type of users—the user-sellers, whether such tax 
incidence is normatively desirable is another question. Should a DST, 
constructed as a turnover tax or consumption tax, logically and conceptually 
pass the economic burden of the tax to one side of users? Or, from a policy 
perspective, can we design a DST as consumption tax where tax incidence is 
absorbed by digital platform firms? This question is particularly important 
because the digital economy is no longer the simple one-sided market the 
traditional tax incidence model has assumed. Furthermore, the digital firms, 
constructed as multi-sided business models and subject to DST, are largely 
monopolistic, and thus may result in a different policy analysis of tax 
incidence. This Subpart further explores this issue in relation to traditional 
and recent studies on the tax incidence of multi-sided business models.   
 
1. Tax Incidence and Fairness 
 
Consideration of the incidence of a tax is important as it represents which 
part of the economy bears the ultimate burden of the tax, and can help policy 
makers determine the overall progressivity and efficiency of any tax 
proposal.217 The incidence of a tax can refer to either the statutory incidence 
or the economic incidence. The statutory incidence of a tax is placed on the 
individuals, entities, or sectors of the economy that have “the legal obligation 
to remit taxes to the government.”218 In the case of the DST, the statutory 
incidence has been placed on those digital businesses with high enough gross 
revenues that offer the digital goods and services targeted by the tax.219 On 
the other hand, economic incidence “measures the changes in economic 
welfare in society arising from a tax.” 220  In other words, the economic 
incidence means who will ultimately bear the economic burden of the tax.221 
 
216 Supra Part II.B.2. 
217 See WILLIAM M. GENTRY, U.S. TREAS. DEPT., OTA PAPER 101, A REVIEW OF THE 
EVIDENCE ON THE INCIDENCE OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 3 (2007), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/WP-101.pdf; 
Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Incidence, NBER Working Paper 8829, 1 (2002), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w8829.pdf. 
218 Fullerton & Metcalf, supra note 217, at 1. 
219 For examples of digital services placing the statutory incidence on targeted digital 
industries, see HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2018 DST, supra note 71; KPMG, supra note 68, at 
9; Sledz, supra note 94; and EY, supra note 98. 
220 Fullerton & Metcalf, supra note 217, at 1. 
221 Stephen Entin, Tax Incidence, Tax Burden, and Tax Shifting: Who Really Pays the 
Tax?, HERITAGE FOUND. (Nov. 5, 2004), https://www.heritage.org/taxes/report/tax-
incidence-tax-burden-and-tax-shifting-who-really-pays-the-tax. 
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This Article discusses the economic incidence of DST, focusing on the 
extent, if any, that the economic burden of DST is borne by the end-
consumers of taxed digital platforms. 
Consumption taxes are usually assumed to be borne entirely by the final 
consumer.222 Many articles follow the accepted view that consumption taxes 
are regressive and thus not good at promoting equity or fairness.223 However, 
there has been contention over how the incidence of consumption taxes 
should be addressed. In studying the distributional impact of introducing a 
broad-based consumption tax, one article suggested that a consumption tax is 
less regressive than would be suggested, because both income and 
consumption taxes treat the capital income of wealthier households 
similarly. 224  Moreover, the OECD analyzed the distributional impact of 
consumption taxes, including VATs and excise taxes, in 20 OECD countries 
and found that the consumption taxes would be “roughly proportional or even 
slightly progressive” if analyzed for expenditure rather than income.225  
The DST has similarly been criticized in that the tax will simply be born 
in large part, if not entirely, by consumers, and thus regressive and unfair.226 
An impact assessment on the French DST by a consulting firm found that 
“[a]pproximately 55% of the total tax burden will be borne by consumers, 
40% by businesses that use digital platforms, and only 5% by the large 
internet companies targeted.”227 It appears then that the implementation of 
 
222 Id.  
223 See generally ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2nd ed. 2007); 
Amy Dunbar & Thomas Pogue, Estimating Flat Tax Incidence and Yield: A Sensitivity 
Analysis, 51 NAT’L TAX. J. 303, 321 (1998); Nico Pestel & Eric Sommer, Shifting Taxes from 
Labor to Consumption: More Employment and More Inequality 16–17, Discussion Paper 
No. 15-042 (2015), http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp15042.pdf (arguing that a shift 
from personal income tax to VAT in Germany has a regressive impact on household budgets 
with budget loss amounts up to 4% of equivalized income). 
224 John Sabelhaus, What is the Distributional Burden of Taxing Consumption?, 46 
NAT’L. TAX J. 331, 343 (1993). The authors suggest this reasoning counters the common 
assumption that consumption taxes do not tax capital income, resulting in theoretical offset 
of the reduction in tax burden apportioned to high-income earners following the transition to 
a consumption tax. 
225  OECD, THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF CONSUMPTION TAXES IN OECD 
COUNTRIES 25–40 (2014). This study found that in the case of income, the consumption taxes 
followed the basic assumption and were regressive. However, under an expenditure 
perspective, the taxes were found to be roughly proportional or even slightly progressive. It 
argued that “an expenditure-based approach provides a more reliable measure of the lifetime 
distributional effects of a consumption tax, challenging the general public perception that 
consumption taxes are regressive.” 
226 Supra note 213 and accompanying text.  
227 Julien Pellefigue, The French Digital Service Tax: An Economic Impact Assessment, 
DELOITTE TAJ (2019), https://taj-strategie.fr/content/uploads/2020/03/dst-impact-
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the DST goes against normative concerns as to the progressivity and 
incidence of new taxes.  
However, these normative concerns may be misplaced due to several 
underlying misconceptions over taxation of the digital economies targeted by 
the DST. The first example is the two-sided platform quality of the digital 
firms which may require completely different analysis as to incidence. 
Second, these large digital firms are generally considered monopolies,228 or 
at least function like them, and are affected differently by taxes as well as 
potentially being able or more willing to absorb the cost of the DST.229 
Lastly, proponents of the DST may be able to adopt the supportive 
contentions that have arisen for consumption tax incidence, as the DST 
essentially functions as a consumption tax. At the least, the DST may benefit 
from the same arguments against the regressive aspect of consumption tax. 
 
2. Multi-Sided Platforms 
 
Multi-sided markets can be defined as “markets in which one or several 
platforms enable interactions between end-users and try to get the two (or 
multiple) sides ‘on board’ by appropriately charging each side.”230 The firms 
at the center of multi-sided markets, or the multi-sided platform firms, are 
essentially intermediaries between the user-buyers (consumers) and user-
sellers (advertisers, merchants, etc.) of the market, and their main function is 
to internalize various externalities generated by the interaction between the 
two groups.231 In order to optimally facilitate interactions, and thus maximize 
profits, the two-sided platform firms must adapt their pricing strategies to the 
demands of the different customer groups. 232  Examples of two-sided 
platform firms include hardware & software systems like Mac OS, digital 
exchanges like Amazon, peer-to-peer marketplaces such as Airbnb and Uber, 
as well as digital media firms like YouTube, Facebook, and Google.233  
 
assessment-march-2019.pdf (determining the pass-through rate of the French DST on 
merchants and consumers). 
228  See e.g., HM TREASURY, UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION, REPORT OF THE 
DIGITAL COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL (Mar. 13, 2019), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_da
ta/file/785547/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf (providing analysis 
of major tech companies as monopolies). 
229 See infra Part III.A.3.  
230 Rochet & Tirole, supra note 7, at 645.  
231 Paul Bellaflamme & Eric Toulemonde, Tax Incidence on Competing Two-Sided 
Platforms, 20 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 1, 2 (2017); Mark Armstrong, Competition in Two-
Sided Markets, 37 RAND J. ECON. 668, 668–69; Rochet & Tirole, supra note 7, at 657. 
232 Hans Jarle Kind et al., Tax Responses in Platform Industries, 62 Oxford Econ. Papers 
764, 765–766 (2010). 
233 Bellaflamme & Toulemond, supra note 231, at 2.  
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The concept of two-sided markets is incredibly relevant to the 
implementation of the DST and the overall discussion over the tax avoidance 
of large digital multinational enterprises. The reasons being that “[s]ome of 
these ‘digital platforms’ have exploited the self-reinforcing nature of network 
effects, together with global reach of the internet, to become dominant 
players in many countries. . . . These companies are well-known to generate 
very large profits but to pay, comparatively, very low effective corporate 
taxes.”234 
The large digital firms that appear to be the main target of the DST fit 
comfortably within the definition and dominating capability of multi-sided 
platform firms.235 These digital platforms have established their powerful 
economic presence through the internalization of cross-group externalities. 
Because these firms rely on externalities in order to determine prices and 
price structure, the typical incidence analysis attributed to one-sided markets 
does not cleanly apply. Most importantly, “two-sided platform firms may find 
it profitable to charge prices that are below marginal cost or even negative 
for one of its products (customer group). This is in contrast to conventional 
markets (one-sided) where marginal cost equal to marginal revenue pricing 
is well established as guidance.”236  
Recent literature on tax incidence of multi-sided markets in the digital 
economy also shows mixed results. For example, Kind et al. found that an 
increase in an ad valorem tax, like the DST,237 imposed on a digital media 
firm may increase sales and reduce price if user-buyers consider the 
interaction with the user-sellers (such as advertisements) as a negative 
externality. 238  Similar findings occurred under analysis focused on the 
hypothetical increase of an ad valorem tax rate on the user-buyer side, finding 
that the price charged on the user-buyer’s side fell following an increase in 
the ad valorem tax rate.239  
In contrast, Bellaflamme & Toulemonde found that an increased ad 
valorem tax imposed on one side of a two-sided market is born by the side 
the tax is levied on—that is, the platform itself—and any competing 
platforms, but that agents on the other side of the market are unaffected.240 
Additionally, empirical analysis by Eleanor Wilking found an increase in 
after-tax prices paid by consumers of Airbnb—user-buyers—following the 
 
234 Id. at 2. 
235 Id. at 2, n.1. 
236 Kind et al., supra note 232, at 767. See also American Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2281.  
237 Kind et al., supra note 232, at 787. Ad valorem tax refers to a tax based on the value 
of the property or transaction subject to tax.  
238 Id. at 774–76.  
239 Sovik Mukherjee & Vivekananda Mukherjee, Tax Incidence of Two Sided Monopoly 
Platforms 25 (2017), https://www.isid.ac.in/~epu/acegd2017/papers/SovikMukherjee.docx. 
240 Bellaflamme and Toulemond, supra note 231, at 9. 
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new obligation of the individual hosts—user-sellers—to remit the relevant 
tax to the digital firm.241  
Such mixed conclusions of recent studies suggest that multi-sided 
platforms may nonetheless follow typical assumptions of tax incidence for 
one-sided markets, but that conclusion may not hold true for all digital multi-
sided platforms.242 
 
3. Monopoly Power and Possible Cost Absorption 
 
Another worthy point to mull over is the monopolistic position of digital 
platform firms, such as Google and Amazon. In a monopoly, firms are 
already extracting maximum profits in current supply-demand, so that a 
newly introduced tax will not pass on to users.243 In other words, firms will 
absorb the tax incidence and will not raise prices. Applying this analysis to 
DST, if digital firms will absorb the incidence of DST, then introducing DST 
is actually a good policy to exploit the rent of multinational enterprises.   
To explain simply, the incidence of a tax partially relies on the elasticity 
of the good or service.244 Taxing the good or service would usually only result 
in an increase in price, effectively shifting the burden onto the consumers.245 
However, monopolies that produce goods or services with relatively elastic 
demands may instead decide to reduce price, absorbing the cost of the tax.246 
This decision results from the monopoly power that the firm exerts in the 
market. Because the monopoly firm is able to set a lower price than 
equilibrium level, the firm extracts supernormal profits derived from 
consumer surplus.247 Taxation of the firm’s profits results in a reduction of 
excess profits similar to the imposition of additional fixed costs.248  
However, analyzing the extent of the digital firms’ monopoly power and 
its possible implications on tax incidence is not easy. It requires extensive 
empirical research until policy makers find reasonable results. If, however, 
the digital economy subject to DST is indeed monopolistic, it is fair to ask 
whether the current French anecdote of passing the economic burden to user-
sellers is acceptable. It further raises questions, such as whether regulatory 
agencies should and could invoke a measure to adjust the economic burden 
 
241 Wilking, supra note 7, at 21. 
242 See generally id. 
243  Rikita Muley, Effect of Taxes on Monopoly Equilibrium (With Diagram), 
ECONOMICS DISCUSSION, http://www.economicsdiscussion.net/monopoly/effect-of-taxes-
on-monopoly-equilibrium-with-diagram/17081 (last visited Feb. 16, 2020). 
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of DST, which is beyond the scope of this paper.  
The refined policy analysis on how to design a DST and what its tax 
incidence should be like is still at the early stage. The discussion above invites 
tax, economics, and public finance scholars to further study the tax incidence 
of DST. One thing clear from the discussion above is that, regardless of the 
normative discussions on the tax incidence of the DST, the function and form 
of the DST is essentially a consumption tax, and thus benefits from the same 
arguments of efficiency and administrability on the international stage.  
 
B.  Why Not Other Types of Consumption Tax? 
Another difficult question in the design and subsequent implementation 
of DST as a consumption tax is whether there is a better type of consumption 
tax to pursue, such as DBCFT or VAT.  
First, as to the VAT, it is worth noting that there is a huge debate on the 
notion of “value creation” in digital taxation discourse.249 Where is the value 
created in the digital economy? In the example of Google, what factors of the 
digital economy contribute to Google’s value creation the most? Is it 
California where engineers have developed and are operating Google’s 
proprietary algorithm? Or is it the market countries where users feed their 
data to the algorithm? The debate of value creation in the digital economy 
resembles the old debate on allocating tax revenue relative to extracting 
natural resources. Are western multinationals with proprietary technology for 
extraction and their home countries the major contributor to the production 
of natural resources and thus deserving of a greater share of tax revenue? Or 
are the source countries with natural resources on their soil the major 
contributor to production and deserve a larger share of tax revenue? The 
discussion has been far from fully resolved. In principle, source countries are 
entitled to primary taxing rights on the rent from natural resources. In effect, 
however, they offer various tax breaks to attract foreign capital. International 
taxation could not solve the puzzle of value creation with respect to natural 
resources in the past. And it is likely that replacing a DST with a VAT may 
repeat the same problem as to measuring the tax base, or the value addition.  
Second and more fundamentally, neither VAT nor DBCFT would be a 
good policy to accomplish what the DST debate aims to accomplish—
rewarding market countries that likely receive less than their fair share of tax 
 
249 See Michael Devereux & John Vella, Value Creation as the Fundamental Principle 
of the International Corporate Tax System, EUR. TAX POLICY FORUM (2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3275759; Johanna Hey, “Taxation 
Where Value is Created” and the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit-Shifting Initiative, 72 
BULL. INT’L TAX’N. (2018); Susan Morse, Value Creation: A Standard in Search of a 
Process, 72 BULL. INT’L TAX’N. (2018); Wolfgang Schön, One Answer to Why and How to 
Tax the Digital Economy, Max Planck Institute Working paper 2019-10 (2019). 
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revenue under traditional tax rules. The DBCFT was proposed during the US 
tax reform debate in 2017, but was ultimately rejected by both the EU and 
the US because they considered it too aggressive and contentious.250 Unlike 
VAT where exports are untaxed while imports are taxed, a DBCFT is 
conceptually easier to apply to cross-border business taxation. Tax 
consequences of both VAT and DBCFT follow the cash flow of the economy, 
but there is no cash flow between digital firms providing digital services and 
user-buyers located in market countries. Thus, the concept of “destination” 
in the DBCFT or VAT may not refer to the market jurisdiction where user-
buyers are located, and thus neither would be effective in rewarding market 
countries.  
In the William-Google example, cash flow exists between the service 
provider (Google in the US) and the user-seller (Mercedes-Benz in 
Germany), and not between the service provider and the user-buyer (William 
in the UK). The destination country in a cash flow tax is where user-sellers 
are located—here, Germany. The cash flow tax or DBCFT will allocate 
revenue to the destination country (Germany), although the market country, 
which all proposals in the DST debate aim to reward, is the UK where user-
buyers are located. Given that there is no cash flow between the service 
provider (Google in the US) and user-buyer (William in the UK), how can 
we reward the market countries under cash flow taxation? Thus, a pure cash 
flow tax and VAT might not be the best means to reward the market 
jurisdiction after all.251     
Also, a recent article by Bankman, Kane, and Sykes implies that a well-
designed excise tax, another type of consumption tax, would be a better tool 
to extract the profits of multinational enterprises than conventional income 
tax and DBCFT.252 Considering the excise tax is another type of consumption 
tax, Bankman et al.’s work is likely to be in line with this Article’s promoting 
DST as a turnover tax.  
 
C.  Overcoming the Ring-Fencing Problem 
The next issue to explore is how to overcome the limited scope of DST. 
 
250 See Daniel Shaviro, Goodbye to All That?: A Requiem for the Destination-Based 
Cash Flow Tax 10, 72 BULL. INT’L. TAX’N. 10 (2018); see also Janet Novack, EU Wrong To 
Challenge Destination Based Cash Flow Tax, FORBES (Mar. 29, 2017, 1:19 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2017/03/29/eu-wrong-to-challenge-destination-
based-cash-flow-tax/.  
251 See Alan Auerbach et al., Destination-Based Cash Flow Taxation 9–13, Oxford 
University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper 17/01 (2017), 
https://eml.berkeley.edu/~auerbach/CBTWP1701.pdf.  
252 Joseph Bankman, Mitchell Kane & Alan Sykes, Collecting the Rent: The Global 
Battle to Capture MNE Profits, TAX L. REV. 47 (forthcoming 2020). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3578348
30-Mar-20] A Cross-Border Variation of the Consumption Tax Debate 53 
The limited scope of DST is created both by the ring-fencing, or segregating, 
of certain digital business models and by the revenue threshold requirements. 
Some commentators attack the revenue threshold and the resulting 
discriminatory trait in support of expanding the scope of DST.253 However, 
given that the revenue threshold requirements are necessary to sort the digital 
firms with monopoly power and subject them to DST,254 it could be immature 
to expand the scope of DST by lowering the revenue threshold. Instead, this 
Subpart proposes to expand the scope of DST in order to overcome the ring-
fencing problem.  
In the UK DST, search engines, social media platforms, and online 
marketplaces are within the scope of DST, but certain regulated financial and 
payment services, the provision of online content, sales of software/hardware, 
and television or broadcasting services are excluded. Thus, Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube, Google, Amazon Marketplace, Kayak, Priceline, Uber, 
and Airbnb are in scope, whereas PayPal, Netflix, Hulu, Spotify, and Ubisoft 
are excluded.255  
The rationale of the current line drawn between the two groups is that the 
policymakers envision a fundamental difference between the two business 
models.256 Lifting the ring-fence may inadvertently and unexpectedly distort 
the market, especially when the ring-fencing occurs due to the specific need 
to distinguish one market from another.257 However, it is still unclear whether 
YouTube or LinkedIn are considered a social media platform that is subject 
to DST or a digital interface providing digital content that is not subject to a 
DST, especially when considering YouTube Premium and LinkedIn 
Premium services. Also, Spotify and Hulu are currently not subject to the 
DST, because they are classified as content providers, but they raise another 
line-drawing question when they offer free or discounted services to users 
who do not subscribe to their respective premium services but are then 
exposed to advertisements. These line-drawing questions, which 
questionably subject one company to a DST and exempt another similar 
company illustrate the need to thoroughly review and question the ring-
 
253 See e.g., Mason & Parada, Company Size Matters, supra note 167; Mason & Parada, 
Digital Battlefront in the Tax Wars, supra note 167. 
254 Supra Part III.A.3. 
255 Cui, supra note 2, at 8–9.  
256 See HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2018 DST, supra note 71; see also HM TREASURY, 
CORPORATE TAX AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: POSITION PAPER 15–16 (2017), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_da
ta/file/661458/corporate_tax_and_the_digital_economy_position_paper.pdf; HM 
TREASURY, DST, supra note 69, at 9–19, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_da
ta/file/816389/DST_response_document_web.pdf 
257 Bankman et al., supra note 252, at 14–18.   
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fencing distinctions.  
In order to examine whether there are fundamental differences between 
the in-scope and out-of-scope business models, let us compare an in-scope 
company, YouTube, with out-of-scope companies, Netflix and Spotify, 
noticing that all three platforms offer online content.  
According to Alphabet Inc.’s annual report, Google and its subsidiary 
YouTube derive the majority of their revenue—i.e., 83% of their revenue in 
2019—from advertisement.258 While YouTube primarily derives revenues 
from the use of engagement advertisements, 259  it generates some non-
advertising revenue through the means of YouTube subscriptions, such as 
YouTube Premium, YouTube TV, and Channel Membership.260  
In contrast, Netflix is solely a content provider. Netflix is the largest 
internet entertainment service with over 167 million paid memberships, as of 
January 2020, throughout 190 countries.261 Netflix offers digital content, such 
as feature films, television shows, and documentaries, which are either 
originally created by Netflix or licensed to Netflix from other studios. 262 
Unlike other streaming services, Netflix does not offer any commercials and 
derives no revenue from paid advertisers.263 Most importantly, it does not 
provide users the ability to share content and does not make its original 
content available for free to all users who choose to watch advertisements.  
With respect to the categories of content provided through YouTube, one 
may discover three different types: (1) content posted by professionals 
attempting to reach a wide audience, (2) content posted by amateurs for a 
small audience, and (3) YouTube’s original content offered only to 
subscribers of YouTube Premium or other subscription-based services. This 
third category of YouTube’s original content is analytically difficult to 
distinguish from the “content provider” business model of Netflix. However, 
while YouTube is in part a content provider, its main purpose is monetizing 
user content through the use of advertisements,264 whereas Netflix is solely a 
content provider.  
 
258 Alphabet, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 9 (Feb. 4, 2020). 
259 Specifically, YouTube generally generates revenue through the use of “engagement 
ads.” Id. at 30. Advertisers pay YouTube when a user clicks on the advertisement. Id. This 
is referred to as “cost-per-click,” because it is a click driven revenue. Id. However, 
YouTube’s engagement ads “monetize at a lower rate than traditional desktop search ads.” 
Id. at 28. YouTube’s cost-per-click is lower than other Google platforms. Id. 
260 Id. at 32.  
261 Netflix, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Jan. 29, 2020). 
262 Id. 
263 Id. 
264  YouTube Premium is one small section of YouTube’s service. Also, YouTube 
intends to make its original content free to all users beginning in September 2019. Non-
subscribers will be subject to advertisements. 
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Although one may find the above differences between YouTube and 
Netflix substantial enough to justify the current distinction between the two 
business models, it would be hasty to push ahead with such conclusion 
without comparing YouTube and Spotify, another out-of-scope content 
provider.  
Spotify Technology S.A. is the largest global music streaming service 
with 271 million monthly-active-users and 124 million users paying for 
Premium Service as of December 31, 2019.265  Spotify has two business 
segments: (1) Ad-Supported Service, a segment focused on monetizing the 
user base through paid advertising; and (2) Premium Service, which is a user 
paid, commercial-free, subscription service “with unlimited online and 
offline high-quality streaming access” to its catalog.266 The Ad-Supported 
segment allows users similar access to content but is subject to 
advertisements.267 In 2019, Spotify’s Premium Service comprised 90% of its 
total gross revenue, earning approximately €6,086 million.268 Spotify’s Ad-
Supported segment generated €678 million.269  
YouTube and Spotify have extremely similar business models and offer 
very similar products to users. First, both offer a commercial-free premium 
service coupled with an ad-based service. Moreover, both services mainly 
license content from third-party providers that the service then distributes to 
users. 270  Additionally, both services pay content providers based on the 
success of the content on the platform.271   
A key difference between YouTube and Spotify is whether the majority 
of revenue is derived from advertisements. Alphabet, Inc. generates 83% of 
its revenue from advertisements, whereas Spotify generates only 10% of its 
 
265 Spotify Technology S.A., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 40 (Feb. 12, 2020). 
266 Id. at 46.  
267 Id. at 47. 
268 Id. at 50. 
269 Id.  
270  Spotify, Spotify for Artists Terms and Conditions, Sec. 6 (Sep. 26, 2017), 
https://www.spotify.com/us/legal/spotify-for-artists-terms-and-conditions/; YouTube, 
Terms of Service (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms. 
271 The content owner for both YouTube and Spotify have a financial interest in the 
content that is licensed to YouTube or Spotify. For example, Spotify pays a royalty fee to 
the content owner. The royalty fee is calculated on numerous factors, including “Premium 
and Ad-Supported revenue earned or user/usage measures.” Spotify Technology S.A., 
Annual Report (Form 20-F), supra note 265, at 55. Similarly, YouTube content owners can 
be compensated based on the number of views of their video. YouTube, YouTube Partner 
Earnings Overview, 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/72902?hl=en&ref_topic=9257988 (“Earnings 
are generated based on a share of advertising revenue generated when people view your 
video. More views may lead to more revenue”) (last visited Feb. 16, 2020). Therefore, 
content owners both receive compensation from Spotify or YouTube, and thus have a 
financial interest in the content doing well on the service.  
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revenue from advertisements. Given that both companies offer similar digital 
services—Premium Service and Ad-Based Service—it is implausible to 
argue that only Spotify qualifies as a content provider that is exempt from 
DST, based only on the fact that most users choose to subscribe to the 
Premium Service, whereas YouTube users do not.  
Part II.B.1 noted the problems with ring-fencing and discrimination, 
which need to be addressed and overcome eventually. A DST should not be 
used against big players. It is against the spirit of a level playing field. 
However, considering the policy need to adopt DST to reward market 
countries and the merits of DST for accomplishing such need, the ring-
fencing problems should be addressed by eventually broadening the scope of 
businesses subject to DST. This may address the discrimination problem as 
well by subjecting many non-US digital firms, such as Spotify, to DST. 
Perhaps Wayfair would offer insight on this issue. The sales tax issue 
discussed in Wayfair also targets the digital economy, but the case has not 
involved ring-fencing or discrimination. After Wayfair, more than thirty state 
and local governments have recently broadened their sales tax base by 
introducing a so-called “Netflix Tax” on digital content providers.272 The fact 
that one type of consumption tax, or DST, excludes digital content providers 
from its scope, whereas another type of consumption tax, state sales tax, 
includes the same business within its scope, only confirms that the current 
line-drawing of DST is arbitrary and needs to be addressed.  
 
CONCLUSION 
G20 and the OECD expect to offer a multilateral, long-term solution for 
taxing the digital economy for a global deal by the end of 2020. However, the 
discourse is largely focused on various income tax-based proposals and does 
not sincerely consider DST a solution. However, DST is already widespread 
and considered the new status quo for taxing the digital economy. While the 
critiques of DST contain merit and need to be addressed, the DST debate 
could be viewed differently when viewing the DST as a consumption tax, 
which has never been seriously discussed. This Article seeks to bring this 
consumption tax perspective to the forefront, which could bring a new life to 
the DST as a solution to taxing the digital economy. 
Furthermore, the timeline of the OECD’s global deal is too tight, 
considering that the issue on the table will result in the fundamental overhaul 
of the international tax rules that has been procrastinated for about one 
hundred years. The agenda on the table is not just about taxing the digital 
economy, but rather taxing the entire 21st century economy, which is 
different from the brick and mortar economy of the 20th century. 
 
272 Supra note 34. 
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Furthermore, the agenda also gives an opportunity to consider an updated 
debate on consumption tax versus income tax in the 21st century economy. 
This requires serious academic research for an extended period that this 
Article aims to start.  
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